

MILITARY AFFAIRS

VOLUME XXII

NUMBER 1

SPRING

1958*



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*Publication Date, May 1958

Published by the American Military Institute

DEVOTED TO AMERICAN MILITARY (INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR) HISTORY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Annual Subscription \$5.00

\$1.25 per Copy



MILITARY AFFAIRS is published quarterly by the American Military Institute. One copy of each issue is supplied to members. Annual subscription to nonmembers is \$5.00. The price of single issues of the current volume and of back issues except Volume I, Numbers 1 and 2, is \$1.25. Issues will be furnished on request. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, editorial contributions, membership, books for review, etc., should be addressed to the American Military Institute, 511 - 11th St., N. W., Washington 4, D. C. Entered as second-class matter at the postoffice at Baltimore, Md., under the Act of August 24, 1912.

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THE PASSAGE OF THE NAVAL ACT OF 1794

By MARSHALL SMELSER*

AMERICANS watched the growing turmoil of Europe during the early years of the French Revolution with mixed fear and hope. Apart from the moral and political issues of the Revolution there was the question of peace. If the continental war expanded to involve the maritime powers the United States might be entangled. But, if the war did become a naval war, the competing nations might open the West Indian trade to American ships and also allow them a part of the trans-Atlantic long haul.¹ In February 1793 Great Britain and France, at last, were at war, with Spain and the Netherlands joining at the side of Britain. The news, although not unexpected, did not arrive in America until April.² From that time until the Congress met in December the chief energies of the executive officers were absorbed in defining and proclaiming American impartiality and in taming the new French Minister, Edmond Charles Genêt, who took a very light view of neutral responsibilities.³

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¹Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Jennie Barnes Pope, *Sea Lanes in Wartime; the American Experience, 1775-1942* (New York, 1942), pp. 65-67; Washington to Rochambeau, 29 Jan. 1789, George Washington, *Writings* (ed. John C. Fitzpatrick; 39 vols.; Washington, 1931-1944), XXX, 188.

²Circ. ltr. to the Consuls of the U.S., 21 Mar. 1793, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter LC); Jefferson to Washington, 1 Apr. 1783, *ibid.*; Hamilton to Washington, 5 Apr. 1793, Washington Papers, LC.

³Papers related to Genêt's annoying behavior make up a large fraction of the Washington Papers, Apr.-Dec. 1793. The President and his cabinet officers also had absorbing personal distractions.

To President George Washington and his Secretaries, the United States seemed quite unready for war at a time when peace was very uncertain. The cabinet officers at first suspected that there would be trouble with Spain. Thomas Jefferson recorded this as the unanimous agreement of the Cabinet late in June.⁴ However, as months passed, the horizon of threat widened considerably and dangers to the ship of state loomed in the haze of war at every point of bearing. The country had better acquire defenses more concrete than a proclamation. In September Secretary of War Henry Knox handed to the President a memorandum of measures necessary for the defense of the United States. He wished to repair, buy, or manufacture small arms, field artillery, lead, and saltpeter or gunpowder, to move magazines inland, and to repair three forts. He had already acted on some of these matters at the direction of the President, but now submitted them in writing for approval so that he could present estimates to the next Congress.⁵ Up to that time nothing had been said about defenses beyond the low-tide mark, although the behavior of the belligerents toward neutral shipping was becoming more and more injurious.

In memoranda used by the President to help him prepare his messages to the new Congress the greatest urgency was given to the task of explaining the neutrality proclamation and to the problem of enforcing it by prohibiting warlike acts within the country

⁴Jefferson to Madison, 23 June 1793, Jefferson Papers, LC.

⁵Knox to Washington, 6 Sept. 1793, Washington Papers, LC. The paper is marked as approved by Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph.

or within the "one league limit." None of the authors of these *aides memoires* suggested building a navy. The perennial problem of American captives in Algiers—who had languished in slavery for eight years—was alluded to once, with the marginal note: "Suspended till the close of the year."⁶ These memoranda, with Knox's earlier paper, showed the formation of a defense policy: a slow, methodical build-up of defensive strength designed only to counter an invasion of North America.

This was the policy presented to the Congress in the presidential messages. The Congress met on 2 December. On the fourth came a message on Indian troubles, with supporting documents. On the fifth, a message on foreign relations, with special reference to the vexatious behavior of belligerents toward neutrals. On 8 December the Philadelphia press had a new and shocking fact—the Algerine pirates were loose in the Atlantic and were seizing American ships. On the sixteenth the President sent a message on that subject, and the Secretary of State sent over a report on foreign trade (which he had held for two years).⁷ The Third Congress now had enough work to do to make it the busiest Congress yet convened. One Federalist, or Federalist sympathizer, saw a silver lining. The bad news might make it easier for the country to adopt proper defense measures, the people accepting "regulations

and burdens to which they would not submit until the danger became imminent." He expected to see a strengthening of the militia, some new coastal forts and patrols, and "perhaps . . . a small Squadron to check the Algerines."⁸

The material damage suffered by the Americans between April and December 1793 had been to their merchant shipping which was harrassed by both sides in the maritime war and by the sea-going extortionists of Algiers. President Washington reported to the Congress that the French had ordered the seizure of neutral ships carrying British property, and the British had limited the grain trade to their ports and the ports of their friends.⁹ What he left to his listeners to deduce was that Britain could enforce her rule and the French could not enforce theirs. What was unknown in the United States at the moment was that the British had issued a new Order-in-Council the effect of which was to be catastrophic to American shipping in the West Indies.

Anglo-American relations were already strained because some important clauses of the Treaty of 1783 had not been executed. The Nootka Sound controversy had then added the impressment of American seamen into the Royal Navy to the list of American grievances.¹⁰ Some Americans were pained by the restrictions on trading in the British Empire but political leaders disagreed on the remedy.¹¹ Because of their experience in the

⁶The memoranda were by Washington, Hamilton, Randolph, and Jefferson, all undated, bound in Washington Papers, LC, November, 1793. On the perennial problem of Algiers, see Marshall Smelser, "The Algerine Theme in the Prehistory of the Navy, 1783-1793," in a forthcoming issue of *American Neptune*.

⁷Samuel Flagg Bemis, *Jay's Treaty, a Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (New York, 1923), pp. 185-87; although news had been coming from the Mediterranean and elsewhere (mostly bad) Benjamin Franklin Bache's *General Advertiser* (later *Aurora*) said on 3 Jan. 1794 that the country had been three months "without intelligence from either England or France." He was piecing out his columns with anecdotes of the Burgoyne campaign and a description of the "Hot Springs of Ice-lands."

⁸Alexander White to Madison, 28 Dec. 1793, Madison Papers, LC. White had been one of the Virginia representatives who switched their votes on Assumption as part of the "national capital deal."

⁹3d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 Dec. 1793, *Annals of the Congress, 1789-1824* (ed. J. Gales and W. W. Seaton; 42 vols.; Washington, 1834-1856), cols. 15, 136-37. Hereafter cited as *Annals*. All subsequent references are to the 3d Cong., 1st Sess. unless otherwise noted.

¹⁰Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (6 vols.; New York, 1932-1936), IV, 124.

¹¹Bemis, *op.cit.*, p. 187; and Thomas Jefferson, "The Anas," 11 Mar. 1792, Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (ed. A. A. Lipscomb; 20 vols., Washington, 1904-1905), I, 299.

War for Independence and their knowledge of the Franco-American Alliance of 1778, the British, early in 1793, expected soon to be at war with the United States.¹² In anticipation, an Order-in-Council of 8 June 1793 (which Washington spoke of to the Congress) provided that neutral ships carrying provisions to France be detained and purchased.¹³ Americans expected impressment of their seamen because of the obvious British need but there was none immediately,¹⁴ although the Foreign Office would make no promises on the subject to the American Minister.¹⁵ The leaders of the Jeffersonian group which was emerging as the Republican Party — Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe — saw British policy towards neutrals as humiliating, and Federalist toleration of it as the elevation of national credit above national honor.¹⁶ Private citizens of the same political persuasion were equally incensed. For example, Hugh Henry Brackenridge published a proposal to conquer Canada¹⁷ and Joel Barlow suggested borrowing naval power from France.¹⁸ The commercial Federalists, who were the most articulate of their group, found profits enough to offset losses and were

peaceful toward Britain,¹⁹ although angry enough at the Jeffersonians.

On the other hand, only the most biased pro-French spectator could say that the French behaved with perfect correctness in the same months. The correspondence of Jefferson while Secretary of State showed that the Administration was exasperated and perplexed in its attempts to deal with the French Minister Genêt. His American-based privateers seized British ships, sometimes in American coastal waters, and his consuls tried to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in the neighborhood of Federal district courts.²⁰ He also encouraged a good many home-grown expansionist projects (nowadays lumped off as Genêt's projects) inciting the Carolinians against Florida, the Kentuckians against the Spanish at the mouth of the Mississippi River, and encouraging the designs of the Vermonters on the Saint Lawrence Valley. His agents also tried unsuccessfully to promote a separatist movement in the trans-Allegheny region.²¹ Of course all of these enterprises collapsed when he lost his accreditation as Minister.²²

These general and more or less predictable troubles of a small neutral during a world war were accompanied by a special difficulty, that of dealing with the North African pirates. This was unfinished business dating back to 1785 when the Algerine pirates seized

¹²Channing, *op. cit.*, IV, 126-27.

¹³Nathan Schachner, *The Founding Fathers* (New York, 1954), p. 292.

¹⁴Lear to Washington, 8 Apr. 1793, Washington Papers, LC; King to Hamilton, 24 Apr. 1793, Rufus King, *Life and Correspondence* (ed. C. R. King; 6 vols.; New York, 1894-1900), I, 440; and undated memorandum, *ibid.*, I, 441. This self-denial was practiced even before the news of the neutrality proclamation reached Britain. Subsequent references to the King publication will be cited as King, *Life and Correspondence*.

¹⁵Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, 4 June 1793, Jefferson Papers, LC.

¹⁶*Ibid.*; Monroe to Jefferson, 27 June 1793, James Monroe, *Writings* (ed. S. M. Hamilton; 7 vols., New York, 1898-1903), I, 266-67; and Madison to Monroe, 5 Sept. 1793, Madison Papers, LC.

¹⁷Brackenridge to Washington, *National Gazette*, 15 May 1793, quoted in C. M. Newlin, *The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge* (Princeton, 1932), pp. 132-33.

¹⁸Barlow to Jefferson, 2 Dec. 1793, Jefferson Papers, LC.

¹⁹Manning J. Dauer, *The Adams Federalists* (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 12-13. The American whaling fleet based in part on French ports, prospered despite its unique French connections. Edouard A. Stackpole, *The Sea Hunters: The New England Whalers During Two Centuries, 1635-1835* (Philadelphia, 1953), pp. 169-75.

²⁰Jefferson Papers, April-December 1793, LC.

²¹Eugene Perry Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800* (New York, 1942), pp. 133-41; an excellent example was the audacious work of M.A.B. Mangourit, Genêt's agent, who tried to promote the Florida Republic. R. R. Palmer, "A Revolutionary Republican," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, IX (Oct. 1952), 483-96.

²²Link, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

two American ships and enslaved the crews. After exhausting every other expedient short of war, money to ransom the captives and buy a peace had been appropriated by the Second Congress.²³ Throughout most of 1793 David Humphreys was in Spain trying to arrange a conference with the Dey of Algiers. The surviving captives were endangered by the plague and were becoming embittered at the years of delay and apparent neglect.²⁴ Humphreys was pessimistic of the chance of coming to terms with the Dey within the limits prescribed by the Congress.²⁵ The hard fact was, as the American Consul at Lisbon implied, the pirates wanted loot so ardently that they did not feel they could make peace with all nations²⁶ but must keep some enemies to prey on. Humphreys found it all the more frustrating to be asked by the British armed forces in the Mediterranean theater to supply them with "all manner of eatables and drinkables. If we had but the free navigation of the Mediterranean," he wrote, "what an extensive market would be open for our produce!"²⁷ Meanwhile the Portuguese had stood guard with men-of-war at the Straits of Gibraltar to keep the corsairs in the Mediterranean. Few

American skippers ventured into that sea, and those few sailed under false colors or with armed friends.

Humphreys' pessimism was justified. In October 1793 the Portuguese called off their watchdogs after a truce between Algiers and Portugal had been arranged by the British. The Algerines sallied into the Atlantic and fell on American shipping. The news reached the press at Philadelphia, the seat of government, on 12 December.²⁸ The possibilities of such a truce and the difficulties it would pose had been thought about for years. Captain Richard O'Brien, spokesman for the captives, Robert Montgomery, United States Consul at Alicante in Spain, and Jefferson had all warned of it.²⁹ The effect of the pirate foray on the business community was bad. United States bonds sagged.³⁰ Business men began talking of a navy, for "the Algerines will deprive us of all the advantages of the present state of Europe."³¹ Although the story had to compete for attention with the enthralling decline and fall of Citizen Gênet (and in Philadelphia with a battle of the Quakers against theater licensing) there were letters in the press written in a tone of genuine anger.³² One exercised correspondent said the government had spent too much money "running a while [*sic*] goose chase after a parcel of Indians" and should

²³The whole story, or as much as can be learned from American archives alone, is in R. W. Irwin, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers 1776-1816* (Chapel Hill, 1931). See also Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Story of the Barbary Corsairs* (New York, 1890); Gardner Weld Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs* (Boston, 1905); United States, Office of Navy Records and Library, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, 6 vols. and Supplement: Washington, 1939-1945), I; *American State Papers* (ed. Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke et al; 38 vols; Washington, 1831-1861), Class I, *Foreign Relations*, I (hereafter cited or ASP: For. Rel.).

²⁴O'Brien to Bulkeley, "March the 26th 1793 & 8th of Captivity," Washington Papers, LC; Humphreys to Jefferson, 26 Sept. 1793, ASP: For. Rel., I, 295.

²⁵Humphreys to Washington, 21 Mar., 4 Apr., 5 May 1793, Washington Papers, LC.

²⁶Church to Jefferson, 12 and 14 Oct. 1793, ASP: For. Rel., I, 296. See also, Jefferson to the Congress, 28 Dec. 1790, *ibid.*, 105.

²⁷Humphreys to Jefferson 26 Sept. 1793, *ibid.*, 295.

²⁸*Idem* to *idem*, 8 Oct. 1793, *ibid.*; *General Advertiser*, 12 Dec. 1793. For a collection of the rumors which were immediately afloat, see *ibid.*, 27 Dec. 1793.

²⁹Jefferson to the Congress, 28 Dec. 1790, *State Papers and Public Documents of the United States* (3d ed.; 10 vols.; Boston, 1819), X (*Confidential State Papers*), 45-47 (hereafter cited as *State Papers and Pub. Docs.*); Montgomery to Jefferson, 26 July 1791, *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, I, 33; O'Brien to the Congress, 28 Apr. 1791, ASP: For. Rel. I, 129-30; and O'Brien to Humphreys, 12 Nov. 1792, quoted in Irwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

³⁰Lawrence to King, 15, 18 Dec. 1793, King, *Life and Correspondence*, I, 506; Alsop to King, 23 Dec. 1793, *ibid.*, I, 508; and Gore to King, 23 Dec. 1793, *ibid.*, I, 508-09.

³¹Gore to King, 24 Dec. 1793, *ibid.*, I, 510-11.

³²*General Advertiser*, 4 Jan. 1794.

have used some of it to build a navy.³³ David Humphreys, deep in pessimism, expected the Algerines to ravage "even the coasts of America," a warning used by navy-minded men as far back as the late 1780's.³⁴

While the Americans were deciding what to do,³⁵ the Queen of Portugal personally intervened on their behalf. She ordered that American ships bound to and from Portuguese ports be convoyed in the piracy zone by her men-of-war.³⁶

Late in November, when his mission to Algiers was dead, Humphreys wrote what was probably the most influential letter of his life. To Washington he said "a naval force has now (to a certain degree) become indispensable." Convoys would not do. Only by offensive war could the United States "hope to catch some of the Corsairs separately, and perhaps out of the Mediterranean."³⁷ When this letter arrived in America it encouraged a movement already existing.

American thinking on the proper remedy for the Algerine evil was somewhat complicated by an almost universal belief that Great Britain had made the Portuguese-Algerine truce for the sole purpose of unleashing the pirates on American commerce.³⁸ It was an

³³*Ibid.*, 1 Jan. 1794.

³⁴Humphreys to Jefferson, 23 Nov. 1793, in Irwin, *op. cit.*, p. 61. See also Marshall Smelser, "Whether to Provide and Maintain a Navy, 1787-1788," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, LXXXIII (Sept. 1957), 946, 947.

³⁵Tunisian pirates apparently stayed in the Mediterranean during these years. The Moroccans had an Atlantic coast but were fighting a civil war and neglecting their ships. Jefferson to Washington, 16 Dec. 1793, *ASP: For. Rel.*, I, 295.

³⁶Humphreys to Washington, 30 Nov. 1793, Washington Papers, LC; *American Minerva*, 15, 17 Jan. 1794 (the text of the Queen's order was printed in the issue of the 17th); and Church to Jefferson, 22 Oct. 1793, *ASP: For. Rel.*, I, 299.

³⁷Humphreys to Washington, 23 Nov. 1793, Washington Papers, LC.

³⁸Even a partial list of believers indicates a remarkable cross section of parties and a mixture of places. For the sake of brevity only the names, dates of expression, and sources are given here: David Humphrey, 7 Oct. 1793, Washington Papers, LC; Joel Barlow, 2 Dec. 1793, Jefferson Papers, LC; Edward Church, 12, 14

admitted fact that the British Consul at Algiers had been the negotiator but the British Foreign Office denied any malevolence toward the Americans. The purpose had been only to relieve an ally of the burden of the Straits blockade so that the ships could be used to help Britain in other ways.³⁹ Since the Algerines were at peace with the whole world, except the United States and the Hanseatic towns, Americans scoffed. For years they had believed in a British plot to perpetuate the hostility of the pirates against the United States and other small trading nations.⁴⁰ (Some Englishmen believed in it too.⁴¹) To many Americans it seemed that the British used the Indians in the forests and the pirates on the seas to the same end.⁴² Denials in the American press were few and brief,⁴³ although Federalist Congressmen later argued that proof of British malice in these matters was lacking.⁴⁴

The Third Congress acted on more military proposals than any Congress before

Oct. 1793, *ASP: For. Rel.*, I, 296; John Lawrance, 10 Dec. 1793, King, *Life and Correspondence*, I, 503; John Alsop, 12 Dec. 1793, *ibid.*, I, 505; Pierce Butler, 19 Dec. 1793, Griffith J. McRee, *Life and Correspondence of James Iredell* (2 vols. in 1; New York, 1949), II, 403-04; Tobias Lear, 25 Dec. 1793, Washington Papers, LC; William Findley, 15 Jan. 1794, *Annals*, col. 234; James Madison, 20 Apr. 1795, *Political Observations* (Philadelphia, 1795), p. 5.

An almost equally large number of pseudonymous allegations of the same guilt was harvested from just two newspapers, one Federalist and one Republican.

³⁹Church to Jefferson, 12 Oct. 1793, *State Papers and Pub. Docs.*, X, 179; Humphreys to Washington, 31 Jan. 1794, Washington Papers, LC; Thomas Pickney to Washington, 25 Nov. 1793, *ASP: For. Rel.*, I, 237; Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-47; Irwin *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.

⁴⁰For example, Leacock to Jefferson [1793], Jefferson Papers, LC.

⁴¹For example, Lear to Washington, 25 Dec. 1793, and, Gordon of St. Neots, England, to Washington, 7 Mar. 1794, Washington Papers, LC. Lane-Poole, *op. cit.*, chap. 19, considers the European toleration of the pirates.

⁴²"Americus" No. 2, *Gazette of the United States*, 29 Apr. 1789; Representatives Nicholas and Clark, 16 Jan. 1794, *Annals*, cols. 243, 246.

⁴³Under heading "BOSTON, Dec. 25" in *American Minerva*, 1 Feb. 1794; a hint is in "Abstract of Weekly Intelligence," *ibid.*, 12 Feb. 1794.

⁴⁴Federalist Representatives said this in opposing Madison's commercial resolutions.

the "X.Y.Z. Affair" of 1798. It provided for harbor defenses, arsenals, and magazines; it increased the Army appropriation and added artillery and engineers; it passed new militia regulations; it dealt with the international trade in arms, with galleys, privateering, and dispatch boats; and it made provision for the widows and orphans of officers. Not least, it voted to build a navy.⁴⁵

The first naval decision came out of secret debates in the House of Representatives on the President's messages concerning the Barbary powers. The immediate result was the adoption, on 2 January 1794, of three resolutions—first, to appropriate additional money for diplomatic expenses; second, to provide a naval force adequate to protect American commerce from the "Algerine corsairs"; and third, to appoint a committee to report what force would be necessary, to estimate the cost, and to advise on "the ways and means for defraying the same." The only roll call was on the "ways and means" clause which was approved 46-44.⁴⁶ This narrow margin was an omen of controversy. Meanwhile, the Senate waited on the House's action.⁴⁷

The Select Committee, appointed under the third resolution, was stacked with shipowners. Only one of the nine, Nathaniel Macon, could be called anti-navy. The party division was Federalists six, Republicans three.⁴⁸ In addition to the documents re-

ceived from the President and the Secretary of State, the Committee had the use of cost estimates prepared by the Secretary of War in 1790, and by Samuel Hodgdon of Philadelphia, for the Secretary, late in 1793.⁴⁹ Its report, on 20 January, recommended the construction of four ships of forty-four guns each (eighteen- and nine-pounders) and two ships of twenty guns. The cost was optimistically estimated at \$600,000. This sum, it recommended, should be raised from additional customs duties.⁵⁰ On 6 February the House resolved to "go into a Committee on the state of the Union" with all mention of the executive documents forbidden, and the debate on the Select Committee's recommendation of a navy was on.⁵¹

Before reviewing the Congressional debate it will be well to notice that there was, of course, an argument out of doors also. General Horatio Gates and Senator James Monroe wrote to friends that the project for a navy was merely a project to centralize power by increasing the patronage and spending of the administration.⁵² Robert R. Livingston thought quicker action was needed and he urged the immediate use of privateers,⁵³ a proposal obviously aimed at Britain. Benjamin Franklin Bache's *General Advertiser* (later *Aurora*) took an unusual line for the fiercest of anti-Federalist newspapers. It

⁴⁵Simultaneously the executive branch launched a diplomatic offensive by sending James Monroe to Paris, John Jay to London, and Thomas Pinckney to Madrid. These missions led to Jay's and Pinckney's treaties and Monroe's recall in temporary disgrace.

A list of the twenty-one ports to be garrisoned is in *Annals*, cols. 479-80.

⁴⁶2 Jan. 1794, *Annals*, cols. 154-55. Madison wished the debate to be public but lost without a division.

⁴⁷16, 24 Dec. 1793, *ibid.*, cols. 20-22.

⁴⁸Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (rev. ed; Princeton, 1944), p. 29. The Federalists were Thomas Fitzsimons (Pa.), Benjamin Goodhue (Mass.), Francis Malbone (R.I.), Jeremiah Wadsworth (Conn.)—all shipowners; Elias Boudinot (N.J.), and Uriah Forrest (Md.). The Republicans were Josiah Parker (Va.), Nathaniel Macon (N.C.), and Richard Winn (S.C.).

⁴⁹Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Our First Frigates, Some Unpublished Facts About Their Construction," *Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers*, XXII (1914), 139-40.

⁵⁰20 Jan. 1794, *Annals*, col. 250; *ASP: Naval Affairs*, I, 5. It was proposed to change the *ad valorem* rate of articles paying seven and one-half per cent to eight and one-half per cent. Specific duties were to be added: five per cent on stone, marble, stoneware and earthenware; three cents a bushel on salt; six cents a ton on American ships in foreign trade; and twenty-five cents a ton on foreign ships.

⁵¹Gates to Madison, 13 Mar. 1794, Madison Papers, LC; Monroe to Jefferson, 16 Mar. 1794, Jefferson Papers, LC.

⁵²Gates to Madison, 13 Mar. 1794, Madison Papers, LC; Monroe to Jefferson, 16 Mar. 1794, Jefferson Papers, LC.

⁵³Robert R. Livingston to Monroe, 4 Jan. 1794, Monroe Papers, LC.

printed one incomplete anti-naval essay, "to be continued," and then gave up the attack.⁵⁴ Indeed the paper had twice before agreed that a navy was necessary⁵⁵ and in printing stories of the captures and cruelties of the corsairs no doubt helped to create a public opinion which made the founding of a navy possible.⁵⁶ Noah Webster's *American Minerva*, a typical Federalist paper although rather more objective than most, regularly printed letters stressing urgency, with occasional sarcastic needling of the Congress for its procrastination.⁵⁷ Both the *Advertiser* and *Minerva* printed a story of an otherwise unrecorded Charleston scheme to buy a frigate for the country with funds raised by public subscription.⁵⁸ The correspondence of interested pro-navy men emphasized the interference of the Algerines with the prospects of a prosperous wartime trade. Oliver Wolcott, Sr., was Anglophobic when he said a navy, "respectable in the American seas," would make European powers more respectful, because they had property on this side of the water.⁵⁹

To return to the House of Representatives, the debate was a debate of North versus South. Of the eleven speakers in favor of the Report only two came from south of the Potomac. Of nine who spoke against the Report only three came from north of the Potomac. Virginia pitted a quartet against the Report. Massachusetts presented four speakers for it and one against.⁶⁰ The Northerners who opposed the report repre-

sented constituencies that were well inland; the others came from tidewater or very close to it.

The arguments of the opposition fell into five categories: economic, political, strategic, diplomatic (with special reference to British policy), and humanitarian.

The economic argument hit at the increasing expense of government. When once a navy was established there would be no end to it. "We must then have a Secretary of the Navy, and a swarm of other people in office, at a monstrous expense." Most of the debt of Great Britain came from naval spending and the Kingdom of France had been ruined by naval expense. The project was also contrary to the policy of paying the national debt.⁶¹ Tables of trade were produced to illustrate the cost of a navy and the savings effected by it. The conclusion was drawn that the savings were not enough.⁶² Since Great Britain and Spain found it wise to bribe the pirates, that must be the better policy.⁶³

Politically speaking the founding of a navy was a dangerous matter. A navy was the most expensive engine of defense and it was the expense of government that fastened tyranny on the people by a system of debts worse than feudalism because it was impersonal.⁶⁴

The strategic arguments were that the force proposed was necessarily inadequate, that the ships could not safely operate in the Mediterranean without assurance of the use of friendly harbors as bases, and that their very existence would be more likely to involve the United States in the war than to make for peace. As for the inadequacy of the

⁵⁴*General Advertiser*, 12 Feb. 1794.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 20 Dec. 1793, 6 Jan. 1794.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 24, 25 Jan., 5, 16 Feb. 1794.

⁵⁷*American Minerva*, 21, 25, 26 Feb., 3 Mar. 1794.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 14, 19 Feb. 1794; *General Advertiser*, 17.

⁵⁹Oliver Wolcott, Sr., to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., 13 Jan. 1794, George Gibbs, *Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams* (2 vols.; New York, 1846), I, 126; Church to Jefferson, 12 Oct. 1793, *State Papers and Pub. Docs.*, X, 280.

⁶⁰*Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949* (Washington, 1950). The Massachusetts man who spoke against the Report was William Lyman of Northampton, a newcomer to the House.

⁶¹Abraham Clark, N.J., 6 Feb. 1794, *Annals*, cols. 433-34; John Nicholas, Va., 7 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 439; William B. Giles, Va., 10 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 447, and 10 Mar., *ibid.*, cols. 490-92.

⁶²James Madison, Va., 11 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 449-51.

⁶³Abraham Baldwin, Ga., 6 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 434.

⁶⁴Giles, 10 Mar., *ibid.*, cols. 490-92.

force, the Algerines had often been at war with nations with far larger navies and had hardly noticed it.⁶⁵ Concerning the lack of Mediterranean bases it had been said that foul weather was foul for the Algerines as well as for the Americans, but the pirates would be near home while the Americans were three thousand miles away.⁶⁶ That a navy would be very likely to provoke war was the sincere contention of the best mind of the opposition, for James Madison wrote to his father "that sending ships of force among the armed powers, would entangle us in the war, if anything would do it."⁶⁷

The diplomatic problem was the question of the effect the creation of a navy would have on the policy of Great Britain. If the British had deliberately "unleashed" the corsairs to damage the Americans no peace could be had by dealing directly with Algiers⁶⁸ whether by war or diplomacy. Certainly Britain had sufficient motives. Her insurance rates were rising. A neutral America was capturing her carrying trade and luring British seamen into American ships. Therefore Britain would prevent the negotiation of any Algerine-American peace,⁶⁹ and would need to take no overt action but merely to aid the pirates "as she did an enemy in another quarter"—the Indians.⁷⁰

The humanitarian point was the opposition's last barb. They assailed the use of force because it would worsen the condition of the Americans enslaved at Algiers.⁷¹

⁶⁵Giles, *ibid.*, cols. 486-90; Nicholas, 6 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 434.

⁶⁶Giles, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 446-47.

⁶⁷Madison to Col. James Madison of Orange County, 21 Feb. 1794, Madison Papers, LC.

⁶⁸Madison, 6 Feb., *Annals*, col. 433.

⁶⁹John Hunter, S.C., 10 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 446.

⁷⁰William Lyman, Mass., 10 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 445; and Madison, 6 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 437. The quotation is from John Smilie, Pa., 7 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 439.

⁷¹Giles, 10 Mar., *ibid.*, col. 497. A year later Madison wrote an anonymous pamphlet, *Political Observations* (Philadelphia, 1795), in which he added more arguments, although it was then too late to do much more than to keep the fires of opposition burning.

Simultaneously with the process of creating a navy the House of Representatives was beating down a set of commercial resolutions introduced by Madison to initiate reprisals against Great Britain for her transgressions against the American merchant fleet. The resolutions were to put into effect the conclusions drawn from the data in Jefferson's report on foreign trade, which had been submitted in December. The resolutions were debated for eighteen days between 3 January and 14 March 1794, although the Naval Bill was argued on only seven days (between 6 February and 10 March). From their private correspondence it seems clear that the Federalists were much more concerned with "Mr. Madison's Resolutions" than with their own Naval Bill. This concern with a concurrent problem has obscured the Naval Bill in later studies. There is nothing in Madison's own papers or publications to show that he took an "either-or" position on the two contested programs but some of his followers in the House regarded the set of resolutions as a competitor of and substitute for the Naval Bill. The Federalists argued that the Madison proposal was a commercial means to a military end, for the benefit of France and the harm of Britain, not for the promotion of American commerce. Most of the Federalist orators avoided being drawn out on the subject of the resolutions as a remedy for the Algerine evil.⁷²

The pro-navy forces seem to have expended about four times as much breath on their

Among the arguments were the following:

- (1) The expense was greater than had been estimated,
- (2) the profit of the trade must be greater than the naval expense in order to justify the naval expense,
- (3) no other branch of trade would be helped,
- (4) the United States could move into whatever trade was vacated by nations moving into our lost trade, and
- (5) the ships would not be ready in time for any use.

⁷²Irving Brant has an excellent account of "Mr. Madison's Resolutions" in *James Madison, Father of the Constitution* (Indianapolis, 1950), chap. 30. I hope to consider the resolutions more fully as a part of the history of American naval thought in another place.

rebuttal of the opposition as they did on their own case.

They were sensitive to the charge that a navy would be an economic drain. A navy would save cargoes and ransoms in the future. Beginning in April 1794 ships westbound across the Atlantic would pay an insurance rate of twenty-five per cent of their value because of the piracy risk, or an extra \$2,000,000. Imported salt would rise a dollar a bushel, perhaps two dollars—the total rise in this one commodity alone being from three to six times the expense of the squadron.⁷³

To the claim that a navy would be an instrument of tyranny the reply was that the same could be claimed of any armed force whatsoever,⁷⁴ that the Congress should not refuse "adequate means to enable the Executive to discharge its Constitutional duties,"⁷⁵ and that it was not complimenting the intelligence of the Congress to say that if it authorized six ships this year it would end by building a hundred.⁷⁶

The supporters urged that the force was adequate, that there was no reason for alarm about naval bases, and that the Naval Bill would not lead the country into a new war. The proposed force was certainly strong enough because the Committee based it on consecutive estimates of the Algerine strength, which pretty well agreed, and the Algerines were unlikely to become stronger.⁷⁷ The Portuguese had blocked the entrance to the Mediterranean with three ships, hence six American ships should be plenty, particularly since they would be newer and better than those of the corsairs.⁷⁸ It was thought sig-

nificant that the opposition did not move to enlarge the squadron.⁷⁹ As for bases, the pirates were at sea in only seven or eight months of the year. American ships would be welcome in the harbors of France, Spain, and Portugal, where they would find ample naval stores.⁸⁰ This choice of harbors was a much larger choice than the Algerines had.⁸¹ It was unlikely that the United States would ever be at war with all three of these nations at once.⁸² As for getting us into a war, any nation that wished to quarrel with the United States would not need the creation of an American navy for an excuse⁸³—for that matter, the country had been at war with Algiers since 1783.⁸⁴

The sponsors of the Naval Bill tried to avoid the admission that Britain uncorked the pirates with malicious intent. They argued the lack of evidence⁸⁵ and the illogic of such an act, which would be more profitable in peacetime.⁸⁶ British aid to Algiers need not be feared because the only useful aid would be naval assistance which would cause an Anglo-American war,⁸⁷ an eventuality which the British would do anything to avoid. But Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts believed the British used the corsairs against the United States and turned that into an argument that peace could not be bought.⁸⁸

No dependence should be placed on Portuguese protection, because Portugal was an

⁷³William L. Smith, 10 March, *ibid.*, 494-97.

⁸⁰Samuel Smith, 6 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 434-35; Fitzsimons, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 438-39.

⁸¹Samuel Smith, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 447-48.

⁸²William L. Smith, 10 Mar., *ibid.*, cols. 494-97.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴Murray, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 440-41. At least one influential Federalist expected to use the frigates against other enemies than the pirates. Lawrance to King, 12 Jan. 1794, King, *Life and Correspondence*, I, 541-52.

⁸⁵Shearjashub Bourne, Mass., 10 Feb., *Annals*, col. 445.

⁸⁶Murray, 7, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 440-41, 446.

⁸⁷James Hillhouse, Conn., 10 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 445.

⁸⁸Goodhue, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 441.

⁷³William L. Smith, S.C., 10 Mar., *Annals*, cols. 494-97; Thomas Fitzsimons, Pa., 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 438-39, 441; Samuel Smith, Md., 6, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 434-35, 447-48.

⁷⁴Zephaniah Swift, Conn., 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 439-40.

⁷⁵William Vans Murray, Md., *ibid.*, col. 441.

⁷⁶Uriah Tracy, Conn., 11 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 448-49.

⁷⁷Fitzsimons, 7, 11 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 438-39, 449; Benjamin Goodhue, Mass., 7 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 441.

⁷⁸Samuel Smith, 6, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 434-35, 447-48.

ally of Britain.⁸⁹ Even if it were possible to secure Portuguese protection such dependence would be humiliating because it would mean that the United States was tributary to Portugal.⁹⁰ It would also mean spending American dollars with no security for performance; how much better to nourish our own industry than Portugal's.⁹¹ The whole project of buying the protection of a foreign nation was irrational. If it were at peace with Algiers no price could be high enough. If at war, no price would be necessary.⁹²

The pro-navy men concluded their assault on the opposition arguments by saying that no constructive alternative had been offered.⁹³

The constructive case of the proponents was relatively brief. Apparently and with reason, they thought the facts of the maritime crisis would not be improved by ornament. However, they equated Indian and pirate defense (if one, why not the other?),⁹⁴ and warned that the Algerines, with renegade or European pilots, might ravage the defenseless coast of North America. Surely the prospect of "the plunder of Philadelphia" would tempt them.⁹⁵ A navy would prevent the loss of merchant seamen to Algiers or by desertion which could be expected because of lack of protection.⁹⁶ As for buying a peace, it would have to be backed by a navy to make it stick, as proved by British experience.⁹⁷ So far the United States had no success in negotiating with the Dey of Algiers; if he saw that the country would not protect its

merchants there was even less hope of success.⁹⁸

Pressure for the Bill was steadily built up from outside. On 3 and 5 March the President sent more supporting documents, including what must have been very effective letters from Humphreys ("no choice" but a navy) and O'Brien who had previously opposed the use of force but who now said there was "no alternative."⁹⁹ On 5 March the merchants of Baltimore handed in a petition for a "naval force . . . adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs."¹⁰⁰ And two days later came the infuriating news of the British Orders-in-Council of 6 November and 8 January prohibiting all neutral trade with the French West Indies and resulting in the seizure of something less than 200 American ships.¹⁰¹ Even men famous for Federalism became hotly anti-British.¹⁰² The passion of the moment would have helped to enact any military measure.¹⁰³

A probable aid to passage of the Bill was its last section, which required that construction of the little fleet be stopped if peace were made with Algiers. This was put in by the House, after the Committee Report had scraped through so narrowly,¹⁰⁴ perhaps

⁹⁸William L. Smith, 10 March, *ibid.*, cols. 492-94.

⁹⁹*ASP: For. Rel.*, I, 413, 418; *State Papers and Pub. Docs.*, X, 311, 325.

¹⁰⁰*Annals*, col. 481.

¹⁰¹Bemis, *op. cit.*, pp. 188, 192; Albion and Pope, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-74. Rufus King's figure was "more than" two hundred. King, *Life and Correspondence*, I, 517-18.

¹⁰²It was this news from the West Indies, the latest in an accumulating series of exasperations, which caused leading Federalists to propose what became Jay's mission. See, Goodrich to Wolcott, jr., 10 Mar. 1794 (Gibbs, *op. cit.*, I, 130), and a Rufus King memorandum in King, *Life and Correspondence*, I, 517-18.

¹⁰³Giles "had observed more votes in favor of the bill since the receipt of late intelligence than before. . ." (10 March, *Annals*, col. 489).

¹⁰⁴"An act to provide a naval armament," Sec. 9, *Annals*, col. 1428. Giles mentioned the existence of Sec. 9 on 10 Mar., the day the bill passed the House; hence it was not a Senate amendment. *Ibid.*, col. 490.

⁸⁹Fitzsimons, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 438-439; Goodhue, *ibid.*, col. 441.

⁹⁰Hillhouse, 10 Feb. *ibid.*, col. 445.

⁹¹Murray, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 440-41.

⁹²William L. Smith, 10 March, *ibid.*, cols. 492-94.

⁹³Samuel Dexter, Mass., 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 445-46; Hillhouse, *ibid.*, col. 445. "Concluded" is here used logically, not chronologically.

⁹⁴Tracy and Goodhue, 11 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 448-49, 451.

⁹⁵Ames, 6 Feb., *ibid.*, col. 436; Samuel Smith, 6, 10 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 435-36, 447-48.

⁹⁶William L. Smith, 10 March, *ibid.*, cols. 494-97.

⁹⁷Fitzsimons and Swift, 7 Feb., *ibid.*, cols. 438-40.

to mollify the opponents.¹⁰⁵

The engrossed Bill was brought in on 10 March. After an unsuccessful motion to recommit, spokesmen for each side summarized the argument—with especial warmth on the negative side, when “the bad consequences connected” with the founding of navies “were depicted in animated terms,” as the reporter drily put it. The vote against recommitting had been 48-41; for passage it was 50-39. Abraham Baldwin, Connecticut-born, Yale-bred Representative from inland Georgia had suspended judgment but now voted nay. It is very likely significant that Peter Muhlenberg of Philadelphia and John Watts of New York City, both Republicans, voted aye.¹⁰⁶

There apparently was never a doubt of passing the Senate, where, after a few amendments readily accepted by the House, approval was voted (19 March) without a division.¹⁰⁷ So confident had the Senate sponsors been that six days earlier they had passed the criminal code with its reference to the Presidential use of the “naval forces of the United States.”¹⁰⁸

“An act to provide a naval armament. . . . Approved March 27, 1794,” had nine brief sections which (1) authorized six ships, (2, 3, 4) set the numbers, grades, and ratings of officers and men, (5) gave the President his choice of buying or building the ships, (6, 7, 8) laid out the details of pay and rations, and (9) provided for the suspension of the Act upon negotiation of peace with Algiers. The preamble said the Act was for the purpose of protecting commerce from the Barbary powers.¹⁰⁹

The pioneer students of the subject found meaning in the sectional distribution of the

House votes on the Committee Report, 11 February, and on the Bill, 10 March. New England almost unanimously favored the founding of a navy, the Middle States were for it two to one, the South Atlantic states opposed it almost three to one, and the frontier states, Kentucky and Vermont, were unanimously against it.¹¹⁰

The question was asked then and often since why so little of the Anglophobia of that season was to be heard in the speeches of the sponsors of the Navy Bill. Contemporary opponents explained it with the epithets “Tories” and “monocrats.”¹¹¹ The answer seems to be that the sponsors, commercial and exporting Federalists for the most part, knew that national credit depended on a high level of imports for national revenue by way of customs duties, which, in turn, depended on a high level of trade with Great Britain. If the Hamiltonian financial design was to endure, Anglophobia was a luxury they could not afford.¹¹² As for their own businesses, suffering at the hands of British and African despoilers, their thinking can be formulated in what one could call the Theory of the Certain Loss. They were for chastising the Algerines because, as things stood, they were certain to lose money by piratical seizures, but naval expenses were not a certain loss. They opposed any reprisals against the British because hostilities with Britain would mean the certain loss of money while sporadic spoils were not a certain loss on the final

¹¹⁰ Sprout and Sprout, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹¹¹ For the opposing conspiracy theories which unhappily imprisoned the thought of both embryonic parties, see Marshall Smelser, “The Federalist Period Reconsidered As an Age of Passion,” in a forthcoming issue of the *American Quarterly*; and, “The Jacobin Phrenzy: Republicanism and the Menace of Monarchy, Plutocracy, and Anglophilia,” in a forthcoming issue of the *Review of Politics*. The ugly hatreds and suspicions were not so apparent in the Congressional party struggles where the rules of debate enjoined the proprieties.

¹¹² Dauer, *op. cit.*; Joseph Charles, “Hamilton and Washington: The Origins of the American Party System,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, XII (April, 1955), 227.

¹⁰⁵ Madison said that Sec. 9 meant that no other use could be made of the frigates without the permission of the Congress, which would probably be denied. Madison, *Political Observations*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁶ *Annals*, cols. 485-86, 497-98.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, cols. 65, 71.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, cols. 1426-28.

balance of their books. There could be no profit in any relations with the pirates; there could be profit in even very restricted trade relations with Great Britain and her West Indies.

The Naval Act of 1794 was part of a general strengthening of the American state, a strengthening undertaken with reluctance. The additions to the Army, the acquisitions of ordnance, and the erection of harbor batteries were each a continuation of expansion of an existing practice or institution. The creation of the Navy was an abrupt change of policy. At the adjournment of the Second Congress one could not have foreseen that the Congress would "provide and maintain" a regular navy only 371 days later. The Congress had been maritime-minded but had been content to rely on a naval potential as a deterrent to foreign powers. American ships had been seized by pirates before 1793 but there was no excitement¹¹³ until new seizures threatened the otherwise bright prospect of large wartime profits.

Although the arguments on the floor of the House of Representatives did not, perhaps, necessarily represent the views of the speakers, they probably said what they felt obliged to say for the record in order to harmonize with the hopes and fears of their constituents. They were a knowledgeable set of successful men and they probably said what would touch the sensitive spots in contemporary thought and feeling. It is improper to dismiss the rural Republican oppo-

sition as narrow, prejudiced, or whimsical. Their reasoning, no doubt, has an antiquarian, rusty creak today, but for their era they had a respectable case that must be examined if one is to have an approximately correct understanding of the popular thought of the past. It should be noted that they supported every defense measure of the session except the enlargement of the regular Army and the founding of the regular Navy.¹¹⁴ It is safe to conclude that their opposition came from the ancient dread of regular establishments and love of militia.

The votes showed their basic weakness. They were unable to hold their city members. The Naval Act temporarily split the "farmer-labor" alliance which was becoming the Republican Party.¹¹⁵ The general support of the measure by Bache's otherwise raging Republican paper, the *General Advertiser*, and the votes of Republicans Muhlenberg of Philadelphia and Watts of New York City showed this.¹¹⁶ Whether the seaport Republicans wished for the fleshpots of naval contracts or were influenced by a naturally more cosmopolitan outlook seems impossible to say.

¹¹⁴*Annals, passim*; and Madison, *Political Observations*.

¹¹⁵As we have been taught by Link's valuable *Democratic-Republican Societies*.

¹¹⁶Frederick Muhlenberg, acting as chairman of the Committee of the Whole, in April 1796 broke a tie by casting his vote in favor of the Jay Treaty. He was not re-elected in 1796 and was replaced by Blair McClenahan, defeat being attributed to his vote on the Treaty (Paul A. W. Wallace, *The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania* [Philadelphia, 1950], pp. 285, 291). His volatile constituency made no difficulty about his naval vote.

¹¹³The previous seizures were in 1785.

AMI Delegates to American Academy

In accordance with instructions from the Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute, two members, Captain Samuel G. Kelly, USN (Ret), and Dr. George B. Dyer of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, attended the Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Academy sessions were held at the Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia, on 11 and 12 April 1958.

equally true that the leaders of the rebellion were still at large. Had the expeditionary commander so desired the ringleaders could have been captured easily; however, strange as it may seem, the British made no effort to track down the rebels. Actually, the commander was somewhat relieved that the rebels had not meekly surrendered but had taken to the bush instead. If they had been taken prisoner when in actual arms against the Sovereign, well and good—the military could have hanged them then and there. But having chosen to flee the rebels were now subject to civil rather than to military jurisdiction, and the expeditionary commander had no desire to permit his troops to be used as policemen or regional constables.

But above and beyond all these minor qualifications was the fact that law and order had been restored by the military at Fort Garry. The citizenry of the Red River Settlement in 1869 had brazenly disregarded the wishes of the federal government in far-distant Ottawa—in fact some of them had taken the law into their own hands—but as of 24 August 1870 such a state of affairs had been abruptly checked. From now on, all Canadians in the area, subjects of Queen Victoria no less, regardless of national origin, racial strain, religious faith, or profession, came to the realization that they would have to conform—or take the unpleasant consequences.

Such then was the rather anticlimatic finale of the Red River Expedition of 1870. From a strictly military point of view the Expedition was truly remarkable. First of all, largely because of geographic considerations, it was unique in the annals of the British Army; second, the experiences encountered and the lessons gained were to be employed in subsequent campaigns by the commanding officer of the Red River Expedition, Colonel Garnet Wolseley, later to win fame in West Africa and Egypt and destined

to be posted Commander-in-Chief of the British Army from 1895 until 1900.

The most noteworthy feature of the Red River Expedition was that it was an amphibious operation. Brought by steamer from the railhead at Collingwood, Ontario, via the Great Lakes to their advanced base at Thunder Bay on the shores of Lake Superior, the troops were to make their way to their final objective, Fort Garry, by small boats utilizing the chain of rivers and lakes flowing into Lake Winnipeg. Aside from the 50-odd portages the troops were primarily dependent on the wind, the oar, and the paddle. Of roads there were none, railroads were nonexistent, and there was not even a telegraph.

Of major importance was the time factor. Herein the expeditionary commander was faced with a difficult problem: The entire operation had to be completed during the summer months, and the margin for mishaps had to be kept to the absolute minimum. Some 1,200 miles separated the barracks at Toronto from the objective, Fort Garry. The troops could not leave the Province of Ontario until the Great Lakes were ice-free; likewise, they had to reach their objective and return to their starting point before the Lakes and rivers of the Northwest again became ice-locked. Ice even one-fourth-inch thick upon any of the many lakes which had to be traversed in frail, wooden boats would have cut through the planking with resultant peril to those embarked. The regular troops upon whose efforts the success or failure of the Expedition depended were scheduled to leave Canada proper in the fall of 1870 as part of the comprehensive plan for the removal of the imperial forces from the Dominion; in short, they had to get in and they had to get out by the same route in as short a time as possible.

The multitude of geographical and physical obstacles along the selected route posed a serious problem. Aside from the hazards of

navigating the rapids in lightly-constructed boats were additional complications imposed by the cutting of trails, the inordinate weariness bound to result from long and difficult portages, the constant annoyance of insects, and the ever-present danger of ambush. As Wolseley was to write many years after the Expedition: "I doubt whether any British force ever began so serious an undertaking under blacker prophesies of impending disaster, which in some instances seemed meant as threats."

The entire operation was a veritable nightmare for a logistics officer. Every single item of arms, ammunition, rations, equipment, and general supplies had to be carried on the backs of the officers and men or dragged by their combined efforts. The Red River Expedition was to see a complete absence of native bearers, animal-drawn vehicles, and other forms of transport provided by civilian labor under contract, which were usually associated with British military expeditions in India and Africa. The Royal Navy and the Royal Marines were also conspicuous by their absence. In this instance the British Army was literally going to have to paddle its own canoe and/or row its own boat. Another complication was the fact that the country through which the Expedition was destined to pass was absolutely devoid of resources, so that the loss of boats or stores meant crews marooned without transportation or food. A rather frightening problem was the disposition of the sick, injured, or wounded. The utter impossibility of conveying non-effectives and the handicapped "imposed another terrible risk on the Commander, for it would have been necessary to leave them on the shore exposed to the mercies or otherwise of Indian tribes."

Herein, incidentally, was one of the remarkable aspects of the Red River Expedition. From the time the troops arrived at their advanced base at Thunder Bay, 25 May

1870, until their return 4 months to the day, there was not a man carried as 'sick' on the rolls nor was there a serious case of injury among the regulars, some 429 officers and enlisted men. At the close of the Expedition Wolseley refused to recommend the senior medical officer for promotion on the grounds that "he had nothing to do, there having never been any sick for him to cure." Although there were numerous narrow escapes from drowning there were fortunately no fatalities. Among the Militia there were but two cases of serious injury, and in both instances the men involved were able to rejoin their parent organizations in comparatively short order. Apparently the rugged existence to which the troops were constantly exposed was such that the general health of the command was maintained at a very high level of physical fitness, and in any event the health record of the Red River Expedition compared with the incidence of disease and injury associated with other military ventures of similar nature during the latter part of the nineteenth century was truly outstanding.

Another unique aspect of the Expedition was the total "absence of crime" at least during the three-month period of the advance from Thunder Bay to Fort Garry. In spite of almost incessant rainfall and annoyance caused by flies, morale of both regulars and Militia remained high, and there were no reported instances of malingering or discontent. Of their conduct their commander was to state "that no men on service have ever been better behaved or more cheerful under trials arising from exposure to inclement weather and excessive fatigue."

In addition to very short rations the troops were to undergo two additional privations of an almost drastic nature, bearing in mind the then normal customs of the service. There was no provision made for either a tobacco or a rum ration. In spite of the rain, fire in the wilderness was a constant dread, and

men were only permitted to smoke what little tobacco they could carry in their packs, after the day's work was done, about the camp fires. The teetotal aspect of the Expedition was a deliberate experiment. Aside from conservation of weight and space it was decided to adopt a practice common to Canadian woodsmen who spent long winters engaged in arduous labor often in freezing temperatures. Like the lumberjacks the troopers could drink all the tea they wanted—hot when they could get it, cold when fires could not be lit—but officers and men alike were denied alcohol in any form prior to attaining their objective. To what extent the absence of hard liquor contributed to the excellent health of the command and the low record of "crime" is purely a matter of opinion; nevertheless, Wolseley's experiment was tailor-made ammunition for the Prohibitionists of the era.

An unexpected feature of the Red River Expedition was the comparative lack of outside interference not only in the operational planning phase but also in the actual implementation. It appeared that the War Office in far off London had "other fish to fry"; in fact the Red River Expedition attracted but little attention. The progress of the Franco-Prussian War momentarily was of considerably greater importance than a campaign in the Canadian backwoods; likewise, the shadow of coming Army reforms under the impetus of Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, occupied a great deal of attention that might otherwise have been diverted to what was transpiring in Manitoba. In any event Colonel Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief of the Red River Expedition, and General James Lindesay, General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Forces in the Dominion of Canada, were able to work out in advance every single detail of the coming operation relatively immune from unsolicited interference largely because of their geo-

graphical isolation and lack of effective means of communication with the War Office.

A peculiarity of the Red River Expedition was the use of riflemen as mounted infantry, a practice that heretofore had not met with great success on the part of the British Army. Although this innovation in military tactics had been utilized by both Union and Confederate forces during the Civil War in the United States and was resorted to on occasion by the United States Army in its subsequent Indian campaigns on the frontier, the British Army normally relied on its cavalry units proper to carry out reconnaissance missions. The Red River Expedition also witnessed the final participation of British regular troops in a military campaign on the continent of North America. And last but not least, the Red River Expedition was one of the least expensive, if not the cheapest, operation of its type ever undertaken by the British Army. It was estimated that the entire cost of the five-month campaign including the transportation of some 1,400 troops from Toronto to the Red River came to under £100,000. In this day and age when annual military budgets are computed in terms of billions of dollars, the cost of the Red River Expedition would appear to be a rare bargain indeed.

If the Expedition itself was out of the ordinary the circumstances which brought it about were no less peculiar and considerably more complicated. The basic cause of trouble in the Canadian North-West Territories was the end of the Hudson's Bay Company monopoly over tremendous land tracts that had been held under Royal Charter as far back as 1670. On 9 April 1869, the Company's charter having expired, the whole of what was then known as the Hudson's Bay Territory reverted to the Dominion of Canada, after lengthy negotiations, in return for the payment of £300,000. Although the transfer was not scheduled to take place until

1 December 1869, the Canadian Government made temporary provisions for the administration of the newly-acquired lands and dispatched a lieutenant governor and a small staff to the seat of the new prairie province at Fort Garry for the actual transfer.

These officials, however, never reached their destination. The French half-breeds of the Red River Settlement, the *metis*, under the leadership of one Louis Riel, initially warned the recently-designated Canadian representatives to stay away, and, to show they meant business, threw up a barricade across the principal trail leading to Fort Garry. The *metis*' motives in their opposition were not without some justification, for they feared that their primitive society and their simple economy would be brought to an abrupt end by the transfer of their homeland, the Red River area, from the jurisdiction of the Hudson's Bay Company to the Dominion of Canada. The *metis* rising, soon to be termed the Riel Rebellion, was therefore less a matter of English and French animosity than a battle between the plough and the prairie.

To the Indian as well as to the *metis*, civilization with the steam railway, the "iron horse," and the telegraph, the "singing wires," meant the end of their isolation and their frontier culture, and any influx of Canadian immigrants from the East would only lead to the ultimate extinction of their easy-going frontier way of life. Louis Riel, self-appointed spokesman for these already-discontented elements, decided to become the principal negotiator with the Dominion of Canada concerning the terms of entry of the Red River Settlement into the Canadian federation. During the fall and winter of 1869-70 the Dominion Government sent a series of envoys to the Red River area in an effort to deal peacefully with Riel and the *metis* but without much success. Eventually, Riel and his followers set up a provisional form of government for the area, and in a

moment of impetuosity seized Fort Garry, then the property of the Hudson's Bay Company, complete with its stores of arms, munitions, food stocks, and other supplies. By March 1870 all negotiations came to a complete impasse when Riel decided to take the law into his own hands.

On this occasion Thomas Scott, a member of a local anti-Riel faction, was captured a second time by the *metis*, tried by a *metis* court-martial, an improperly constituted tribunal, convicted, and executed in a particularly brutal manner by a group of half-intoxicated *metis*. Admittedly Scott was neither a popular nor a respectable citizen; however, he was a subject of the Queen, he was an Anglican in contradistinction to the overwhelming majority of the French half-breeds who nominally were of Roman Catholic faith, and he was a native of the Province of Ontario. As a result, the politicians made an issue of all this in short order—all the pent-up emotions of racial and religious animosity were pulled out of the bag—and Scott's execution or murder was converted into a political dispute. Likewise, the feelings of the Canadians on the Red River were thoroughly aroused. To them Riel and the *metis* were outlaws and murderers. They must be brought to justice and punished for their crime as prescribed by the law of the land.

It was this sorry state of affairs in the Canadian Northwest that triggered the dispatch of the Red River Expedition in May 1870. Aside from the desire to bring the perpetrators of Scott's murder to account was the advisability of stationing a permanent military garrison in the recently-created Province of Manitoba. Two factors influenced this decision: the desire to discourage future would-be insurrectionists against the federal government and the concern of the Dominion Government over the activities of certain American filibusters and fanatical

Irish-American bands, the Fenians. These latter individuals, during the period 1866-70, as a result of a series of armed raids along the Canadian-American Border, had caused considerable embarrassment to responsible officials of both nations. There being no civil police force capable of maintaining law and order in such a sparsely-populated area, it was considered advisable to make a show of military force on the Canadian side of the border to assist the provincial authorities of Manitoba in keeping the peace.

The success of the Red River Expedition may be attributed to the fortunate choice of an outstanding military leader coupled with the selection of one of the best-fitted elements of the entire British Army, bearing in mind the mission of the Expedition and the rigorous field-service conditions peculiar to the theater of operations. On the advice of General Lindesay, Colonel Garnet Wolseley was selected as Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary force.

Wolseley was then serving as Deputy Quartermaster-General of Her Majesty's Forces in the Dominion of Canada. At 37 this relatively young colonel had proven himself to be not only an able field soldier but also a capable administrator and an efficient staff officer. Initially commissioned in 1852, Wolseley served with distinction in the Burmese and Crimean Wars, participated in the Relief of Lucknow incident to the Indian Mutiny, and was present at the taking of the Taku Forts and Peking in 1860. He had been wounded no less than four times during the Crimean War—the near loss of sight in one eye necessitated his transfer from line to staff; he held two brevet promotions for gallantry in action; and he had been mentioned nine times in despatches. During the Civil War he had occasion to meet General Lee at the latter's headquarters following the Battle of Antietam, and he also visited "Stonewall" Jackson and Longstreet. His

Canadian service included duty as commanding officer of the combined Military Academy and Staff School at La Prairie Camp (near Montreal), and as a result of this experience came to have a very high regard for the capabilities of Canadians as soldiers.

Purely by chance the Imperial Garrison in Canada was composed of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Rifles, under Lieutenant Colonel Randle Feilden. This Regiment, now designated the King's Royal Rifle Corps, had a long and distinguished record of service. It had been raised in North America as the 60th, Royal Americans, during the French and Indian War, and had participated at Fort Duquesne, Louisburg, Quebec, Montreal, and Bushey Run. Thereafter it had performed with great distinction in the American Revolution, in the West Indies, in the Napoleonic Wars, in India, South Africa, and China. In March 1866, the 1st Battalion was transferred from Malta to Canada to replace the 4th Battalion of the same regiment which had been dispatched to North America in 1861 shortly after the notorious Trent Affair. Initially serving as the garrison at Quebec, the 1st Battalion in 1868 was moved westward, and the troops were quartered at Ottawa and Toronto.

As its name implies, the Royal Rifles was a rifle regiment in contradistinction to a foot regiment of the line, and, in common with other rifle regiments of the British Army, had several unusual characteristics. It was no "Redcoat" outfit, for its troops were clothed in the dark green jackets, black trousers, and black-cloth headgear; of white pipe-clayed cross belts there were none—all leather equipment was black; there was not a fife or a drum in the regiment—only bugles; and it carried no colors but had its many battle honors inscribed on its badge, the bronze Maltese Cross bearing the regimental motto, *Celer et Audax*, conferred by General Wolfe. The troops were armed not

with muzzle-loading Enfields but with breech-loading Snider rifles; sword bayonets were carried rather than the then conventional triangular-blade models; all marching was conducted with rifles "at the trail" and at a more rapid step than was normally employed by foot regiments. The Royal Rifles to all intents and purposes was a light infantry unit with much of the rigidity common to the drill of foot regiments replaced by a more flexible organization better adapted to field-service conditions without sacrificing any of the extremely strict discipline then in vogue in the British Army. As such, the 1st Battalion was admirably suited for its coming venture through the Canadian wilderness; moreover, thanks to the zeal of its officers it had been trained to a very high degree of efficiency.

Following the Dominion Government's decision to dispatch a military expedition to the Red River area, permission of the Home Government was obtained promptly for the employment of Imperial troops in conjunction with Canadian Militia units. Colonel Wolseley, assisted by officials of the Hudson's Bay Company and the Canadian Public Works Department, drew up complete tables of organization, equipment, and allowances for the expeditionary force following a detailed study of the terrain of the most feasible route of approach to the objective, including the line of supply and communications.

In line with Wolseley's suggestions, it was decided to mount a force of some 1,200 troops, of which one-third would be regular troops from the Imperial Garrison, and the remaining two-thirds would be composed of Canadian Militia. The Imperial quota consisted of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Rifles, some 23 officers and 350 men under command of Lt. Col. Feilden. The battalion was made up of seven rifle companies (the 8th, E Company, was to remain behind as rear echelon)

each composed of 3 officers and 50 enlisted men. Other Imperial elements included four 7-pounder mountain guns from H Battery, Royal Artillery, a section of Royal Engineers, and representatives of both the Army Service and Hospital Corps. In addition a Land Transport Service unit was organized, a corps of teamsters was raised, wagons and carts were built, and horses were procured largely from two batteries of artillery under orders to return to England.

The Canadian Militia quota consisted of two battalions of rifles each with some 25 officers and 350 men, one from the Province of Ontario, the 1st or Ontario Rifles, under Lieutenant Colonel Jarvis, and the other from the Province of Quebec, the 2nd or Quebec Rifles, under Lieutenant Colonel Cassault. Similar to the organization of the regular battalion, the Militia contingents were organized on the basis of seven rifle companies each with 3 officers and 50 enlisted men. The object of these small companies was to embark each company into a brigade of six small boats once the expedition became waterborne on the lakes and rivers of the Northwest.

A body of some 200 trained boatmen, officially termed *voyageurs*, largely procured through the assistance of the Public Works Department, was selected to accompany the Expedition. With the exception of a group of Iroquois Indians, however, these civilians under contract turned out to be more of a nuisance than of assistance as it was found difficult to control their activities. On the other hand, the Boat Transport Service provided by the Public Works Department was a most efficient undertaking. Herein under its supervision some 175-200 combination rowing-and-sailing craft were constructed to order for the expeditionary force at various boat-building establishments throughout the Dominion. The boats varied between 25-30 feet in length, were designed to carry four

tons of cargo, and provided transportation for nine or ten soldiers and two or three *voyageurs*. Of wooden construction, they were equipped with masts and sails in addition to oars, chests for ammunition, rifles and tools, barrels and cases for staples, tentage, and other equipment. The heaviest unit containers were the pork barrels of 200 pounds each, which were distributed to average seven or eight to a boat.

The route of the expedition from Toronto to Fort Garry was largely determined through the process of elimination. Unable to pass through United States territory because of Fenian lobbying in Washington and denied an approach through Hudson's Bay by melting ice and snow as well as by treacherous muskeg, the only remaining route was the long haul via the Great Lakes and across the watershed to the rivers draining into Lake Winnipeg. On 14 May 1870, Lake Superior being free of ice, the advance elements of the expeditionary force left Toronto by train for Collingwood, 94 miles to the northwest on Georgian Bay. This, the advance party, was composed of the 1st Ontario Rifles and minor supporting units, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, Royal Artillery, the Expedition's Second-in-Command. At the railhead the troops boarded a steamship and commenced the water-transport phase of the operation via Lakes Huron and Superior to the advanced base at Thunder Bay, a distance of 534 miles.

Access to Canadian possessions on Lake Superior could only be achieved by transit of a canal on the American side of the boundary line between Canada and the United States inasmuch as the rapids on the St. Marie River were impassable. American attitude toward the use of their canal by armed Canadian or British troops being then anything but favorable, the Canadians were forced to land everything on their side of the rapids, transport it by land across a

three-mile portage, and reload all their gear at the upper end. Eventually, the United States relaxed to the extent permission was granted for empty Canadian transports to transit the canal; nevertheless, at the very outset considerable delay and inconvenience befell the Expedition.

On 21 May 1870, Colonel Wolseley, his staff, five companies of the Royal Rifles, and the major part of the Land Transport Service group left Collingwood by steamer, and after making the portage at Sault St. Marie disembarked on 25 May at Prince Arthur's Landing, near the present site of Port Arthur at Thunder Bay on the extreme northwest shore of Lake Superior. At this spot the advanced base was erected, including a small field hospital and a redoubt, garrisoned by a militia company and armed with two of the four mountain guns. While awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the expeditionary force (the final elements did not reach Prince Arthur's Landing until 21 June) the troops then present commenced their way inland over what was considered one of the most difficult stretches of the entire approach route to the objective—the 50-mile strip of land separating Lake Superior and Shebandowan Lake. This terrain barrier was the watershed between the streams flowing southward into Lake Superior and a chain of lakes and rivers flowing northward into Lake Winnipeg. To cross this watershed meant ascending a chain of little-explored mountains in which the lowest pass was some 840 feet above the elevation of Lake Superior.

Contrary to information supplied by Canadian Public Works officials, Wolseley discovered that the only "road" across the barrier was a narrow, wilderness trail, strewn with stumps. The alleged bridges were found to be woefully inadequate; likewise, the last twelve miles were just so much virgin timber. In spite of the incessant rain, by mid-

uly the Expedition somehow carried, pushed, poled, and dragged itself and all of its boats and supplies over the watershed, and a combination supply depot and boat-repair base were promptly established at McNeil's Bay on the shores of Lake Shebandowan. All of the regular troops and almost half of the Militia having arrived more or less intact from Prince Arthur's Landing, Wolseley decided to push on forthwith for time was of the essence, the short summer being now half spent. The Expedition was now 678 miles from Toronto but it still had 560 miles to go to reach Fort Garry.

Allowing himself forty days to attain his final objective, Wolseley loaded his boats with sixty days' supplies, and on 16 July his force, now totalling some 45 officers and 443 enlisted men, embarked aboard sixty-eight small craft at McNeil's Bay, leaving a company of Militia to guard the supply depot. Once across Lake Shebandowan the Expedition followed the Kaministiquia River westward toward Rainy Lake and the Lake of the Woods. Within ten days' time the Expedition was spread out on the various lakes and rivers for a distance of 150 miles from point to rear guard.

By 4 August the advance party had reached Fort Francis after having traversed seventeen difficult portages since its departure from Lake Shebandowan. Here a Militia company was detached to guard the main supply route, and Wolseley was also advised by his scouts that as the road between the Lake of the Woods and Fort Garry was literally impassable (plus the strong likelihood of Riel's emplacing an ambush across the trail), the only resource was to continue the advance by water via the Winnipeg River and Lake Winnipeg proper. Having crossed the Lake of the Woods, on 11 August the advance party arrived at Rat Portage where Wolseley was met by guides sent from the Red River area by an Anglican

clergyman.

The Expedition immediately undertook the descent of the swift-flowing and extremely hazardous Winnipeg River which dropped in elevation some 340 feet between Rat Portage and Fort Alexander on Lake Winnipeg. After great hardship, including the traversing of thirty portages around the worst falls and rapids, all of the boats of the advance party made the transit safely by 20 August, and on arrival at Fort Alexander Wolseley received further news concerning events at Fort Garry: Reil had now banded together more than 500 of his followers and all indications pointed to armed resistance on his part when and if the Expedition arrived. Although two Militia companies had not yet caught up with the advance party, Wolseley decided to proceed the following day.

Leaving Fort Alexander with only the regular troops, now embarked in fifty boats, Wolseley sailed and rowed along the shores of Lake Winnipeg, reached the mouth of the Red River, and ascended it as far as Stone Fort, twenty miles downstream from Fort Garry. Landing at that place before noon on 23 August, he unloaded the better part of his supplies, distributed arms and ammunition, and detailed B Company, the Royal Rifles, as a mounted infantry flank guard. Mounts were secured locally for the riflemen and detachments were sent out to scout both banks of the Red River and to cover the waterborne advance of the main party upon Fort Garry, scheduled for the following morning. It was later claimed that "this was the first instance—at all events since the American War of Independence—of riflemen being utilized as Mounted Infantry."

During the night of 23 August a bivouac was made on the western bank of the Red River, six miles below Fort Garry. At 0600, 24 August, the troops landed at Point Doug-

las, two miles from Fort Garry by road but more than twice that distance by river inasmuch as the Red River made a wide bend at that point. It was Wolseley's intention to approach Fort Garry from the west which would thus enable him to surround the fort and to catch Riel and his band in the right angle formed by the junction of the Red and the Assiniboine Rivers. Riel, however, did not wait for the encirclement to be completed, but after hauling down the rebel flag, quickly bolted out the south gate of the fort accompanied by his "Secretaries of State," Lepine and O'Donoghue.

Thereafter, as has been previously related, the occupation of Fort Garry was completed by Wolseley's troops. Riel eventually got across the border into the United States, but fifteen years later, following another insurrection, this time in the neighboring Province of Saskatchewan, he was caught and finally hanged in 1885. As one of Riel's jurors some fifty years after the event was to state: "We tried him for treason, and he was hanged for the murder of Scott."

By 28 August the last of the Canadian Militia units arrived at Fort Garry, and they immediately took over duty as permanent garrison (both battalions were to remain there throughout the winter of 1870-71). The regular troops (having literally drunk the town of Winnipeg dry after their period of abstinence in the wilderness) being equally anxious to return to Eastern Canada before the early fall snows, departed on 29 August to return to Thunder Bay via the lakes and rivers, and by 15 October the 1st Battalion of the Royal Rifles was united at Toronto barracks.

On 2 September, the new Lieutenant Governor, A. G. Archibald, was installed at Fort Garry, and Colonel Wolseley, his mission completed, turned over command of the garrison to Colonel Jervis of the Ontario Rifles, and commenced his return to Eastern Can-

ada. The 1st Battalion of the Royal Rifles immediately proceeded from Toronto to Quebec, and on 11 November 1870 embarked on "H.M.S. Orontes" for Halifax, Nova Scotia. This regiment had been present at the surrender of Quebec in 1759, and had seen the Union Flag hoisted on the flag-staff of the Citadel. This same regiment, the last British troops to be garrisoned in Canada proper, was to witness the replacement of the Imperial flag by the flag of the Dominion of Canada.

In retrospect, it might be said that in general the Red River Expedition was lucky. It had carried out its assignment most expeditiously and efficiently without bloodshed or loss of life in spite of grave hazards, natural obstacles, and the constant threat of ambush. In the writer's opinion, however, the success of the Red River Expedition was assured by the careful planning and execution of the operation by its commanding officer, Colonel Wolseley. Likewise, there appears to be little doubt that the troops themselves, British and Canadian alike, were well-disciplined and adequately trained—they were best-fitted for the peculiar nature of their mission. Therefore, it may well be argued that the success of the Expedition was less a matter of just plain luck than one wherein the good fortune that seemingly often accompanies calculated audacity was most evident.

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Cantigny War Memorial Museum

The Society of the First Division as well as the Department of the Army have approved the establishment of the Cantigny War Memorial Museum as a sanctuary for the famed First Division whose exploits in both World Wars of this century are well known. It will serve as a home for the Division. Here will be displayed the relics, records, insignia, and other memorabilia of the Division, not only for recent wars but also for the Spanish War, the Civil War, and the War of Independence. A library to be operated as a part of the Museum will provide students, scholars, and writers with source material on military operations. Former commanding generals and other officers of the First Division will deposit their personal papers and relics in the Museum. The Museum was originally conceived by the trustees of the Colonel McCormick Estate, and the Museum Foundation was chartered as a non-profit institution by the State of Illinois, on June 26, 1957. Arthur A. Schmon of Ontario, Canada, is president of the Foundation; and Major General Clarence R. Huebner is chairman of the Board. To date a quarter million dollars have been committed for building purposes.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE WRITING OF MILITARY HISTORY

By MAURY D. FELD*

The current program of war histories as undertaken by the historical divisions of the various services has given us a set of campaign and organizational histories. While these are doubtless of great merit, their use is largely restricted to fellow historians, both of wars as such and of political organizations involved. They follow the fortunes of war from the viewpoint of an objective observer. They also largely by-pass the conception and development of the instruments of these fortunes as seen from the subjective position of the staff planner and the combat commander. What is lacking is an historical approach which would correspond to the studious needs of the active practitioner and scholarly critic; one which would deal with military history *sui generis*, which would study it in terms of its development as an art or as a science in the way that other arts—painting—and science—physics, astronomy etc., are studied by students of the history of ideas.

Campaign histories, as presently written, deal with the movements of organized bodies of men, their success and failure, their ability or inability to make plans and to carry them out. They do not deal with the transformation suffered by military formations and instruments in the process of arriving at these results. We have been presented with

a narrative of human migration as guided by the chances of war. We have not been given an historical and analytical treatment of the principles and the criteria of the organizations which directed these men, and of the tools which allowed or prevented them from attaining their goals.

The student of military history is thus placed in a curiously narrow position. It is as if the study of the history of medicine were restricted to narrative accounts of major surgical operations, without any data as to the state of the anatomical and physiological knowledge and theory involved, and of the effect and interplay these had on medical diagnosis and practice.

What is required, therefore, is a series of military studies which approach command personalities as students and practitioners of a continually developing profession, one, moreover, which is in constant flux with the never-ceasing developments of societies and techniques. Campaign histories, as we have them, treat military organizations as one factor—albeit the self conscious, and therefore the central one—in ecology of war. Surely, we have an equal need for an account of military organizations as abstract entities, as the foci of the interplay of the theory and practice of their art.

As a set of examples for what I have in mind, I propose the following:

1. A study of the development of divisional structure would start with the deci-

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sion taken at the eve of World War II to transform the army divisions from a square to a triangular form. It would proceed from a discussion of this decision to a survey of the reports on the new triangular divisions as they came into existence. The formation and the training of these divisions and the effect comments and criticism of field commanders had on their development would be described. From there, the divisions would be followed into combat, with the narrative organized according to the various theaters. Experiences and comments of combat commanders would again be stressed, with particular emphasis on personal interviews. The reception and evaluation of these comments back in the Pentagon would be described in terms of their effect on the evolving divisional structure. Finally, the history would, proceeding along these lines, trace the evolution of the triangular division into the combat team organization. Bringing it up to date, this discussion would be prolonged through Korea, up to the organization of the present 101st Airborne division.

2. In similar fashion the development of the B-17 bomber could be related.

3. For the Navy such a treatment could be extended to the carrier task force and the fleet train.

This approach would permit the experiences of field commanders to be recorded in a form which would provide material necessary for the formulation of military theory, much the same way as Folard and Guibert, the organizational problems of the French Revolutionary Armies, and the Prussian military reforms provided the underpinnings of Clausewitz. It would make clear to military students the interplay of concept and experience, which is the basis of their profession. Lastly, it would transform senior military writers from memorialists to analysts, and give a living force to the form of peacetime military experience.

The process of "challenge and response" treated in military histories of the type here championed can be much more readily and accurately reproduced for the purposes of war games than the conventional form and material of previous battles. In the case of the latter, we are involved with the intentions and morale of a potential enemy, factors which can not be adequately anticipated or constructed. Functional military histories of the new order would thus provide a background for active practitioners in areas where decisions must be made, divorced from and anticipating the trials of combat, areas where experience is often all too dearly bought.

Antiaircraft Becomes Air Defense

The Commanding General of the U. S. Army Air Defense Command, Lieutenant General Charles E. Hart, has announced that USARADCOM brigades and groups have *been renamed "air defense artillery" units. They were formerly called "antiaircraft artillery."*

According to USARADCOM, the change can be marked down as a sign of the times. It emphasizes the shift Army air defense forces have made from antiaircraft guns to the modern, surface-to-air missiles during the last four years.

General Hart said the change conforms with the redesignation of the command itself last year. Previously known as the Army Antiaircraft Command, it was renamed the U. S. Army Air Defense Command in March, 1957. He pointed out that the new designation gave the command a title descriptive of its mission.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Grand Strategy, Volume II, Sept. 1939-June 1941. By J. R. M. Butler. [History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series.] (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1957. Pp. 603. \$7.82).

Winston Churchill and the Second Front. By Trumbull Higgins. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. 281. \$6.00.)

The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945. By Samuel Eliot Morison. [History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, XI.] (Boston: Little Brown. 1957. Pp. xxviii, 360. \$6.50.)

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. By Herbert Feis. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. 692. \$6.95.)

Grand Strategy, Volume V, Aug. 1943-Sept. 1944, and Volume VI, Oct. 1944-Aug. 1945. By John Ehrman. [History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series.] (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. Pp. 634 and 422. \$7.82 and \$5.60.)

The great debates on strategy in World War II are examined in detail in these six volumes by British and American historians. Anglo-French, Anglo-American, and Anglo-American-Russian agreements and disagreements are explored, with chief emphasis on the proposals for peripheral versus direct approaches to the Continent. The three British volumes, by Butler and Ehrman, are official histories; Admiral Morison's book, like others in his series on the U. S. Navy in World War II, is semi-official and largely concerned with operations; Mr. Feis's book, while non-official, obviously draws on his wartime experience

in the State and War Departments as well as on some unpublished papers; Professor Higgins' study uses some interview material but relies mainly on published sources, including the complete works of Prime Minister Churchill and the memoirs of his contemporaries.

Professor Butler in his early pages deals with British and French efforts in 1939 to adopt a proper strategy to meet German attacks. The British, ill-prepared for war, were forced to strip themselves of Regular divisions for action on the Continent, leaving at home "a token force of semitrained troops." The RAF resisted somewhat more successfully French pressure for a larger British air commitment in France. We are led through the lull of the phony war, the disasters of 1940 in Norway, the Low Countries, and France to the successful evacuation from Dunkirk and Mr. Churchill's vain efforts to keep France in the war. We then follow his ruthless attempts to prevent French ships from falling into German hands and his backing of De Gaulle's efforts to form an effective Free French force. Many of these are twice-told tales, related perhaps more interestingly, if not always as impartially, in the memoirs of Churchill, De Gaulle, and General Spears. Butler is unworried about the British action against French ships at Oran, noting with favor his country's action against the Danish fleet at Copenhagen during the Napoleonic wars and concluding "it was as essential in 1940 as in 1807 that the naval power of Great Britain should not be endangered."

Professor Butler outlines strikingly the magnitude of Britain's task when, between the fall of France and the German invasion of Russia, she

stood virtually alone. During twelve months marked by the collapse of France, enemy occupation of most of the Continent, Italian declaration of war, strong doubts about continued Spanish neutrality, troubles in Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa, heavy losses inflicted by German submarines, and the massive attacks of the Luftwaffe, the British were supposedly free to choose their strategy without having to consult an ally. But it was a freedom limited by their lack of resources and the German menace from air, land, and sea. Besides her own determined efforts, Britain was aided mainly by the fact that in 1941 the United States showed less and less a neutral spirit and ended with assistance just short of war. Professor Butler records various evidences of this "welling tide of American help. . ."

Britain found theoretically that she had a wider range of strategic choices when Soviet Russia entered the war. With Germany sending her main forces against the Red armies, the British could expand their efforts in the Mediterranean or the Middle East or attempt to open a second front on the Continent. Actually, the lack of landing craft and men in 1941 restricted the choices. Nor did Pearl Harbor immediately remedy the situation. The events of December 7, 1941, gave the British a new partner, but also a new enemy—one who easily won the first round in the Pacific. Important British holdings soon fell to the Japanese, whose forces threatened Burma, India, and Australia. Churchill also faced the possibility that a humiliated and angry United States might put aside its earlier understanding with Britain that, in a war with Germany and Japan, the two Allies would make their main effort against Germany.

Despite strong American public reaction against Japan, Roosevelt and his advisers held firmly to the strategy of Germany first, while dispatching to the Pacific enough men and supplies to fight a holding action. Awareness of the Japanese menace was a constant factor in the insistence of the United States on a speedy end to the war in Europe.

While British and American leaders agreed fully that Hitler must be defeated first, they disagreed strongly over the proper approach to that goal. These debates, already discussed in more than a score of books, are considered at length by Feis, fill the first chapter of Morison's volume, and occupy the whole of Higgins' account. Ehrman, whose Volume V begins with the fall of 1943, assumes that the cross-Channel strategy had been settled by the first Quebec Conference,

but finds several opportunities to develop some aspects of the Allied disagreement on this subject.

In a sweeping attack on the British argument for an indirect rather than a direct approach, Professor Higgins hammers Mr. Churchill for his preference for peripheral actions and suggests that the British leader never intended to do the cross-Channel operation until the enemy was virtually destroyed by Russian manpower, Allied airpower, risings of subject peoples of Europe, or some other means. He holds that Churchill's view was the British view, a conclusion contrary to Sir Arthur Bryant's claim that Field Marshal Alan Brooke was the chief architect of British strategy. Admiral Morison, though quite vigorous in his recent reviews and speeches criticizing some of Sir Arthur's theses, agrees in his book that Alan Brooke "shared the American belief that the ultimate key to victory was a successful landing in Europe" and that while he wanted to complete a series of Mediterranean operations first, he had no respect "for the Churchillian strategy of jabbing all around the ring from the North Cape to Rhodes. . . . "Mr. Feis is content to say that Churchill was "faithful to the plan that had been adopted for the cross-Channel operation and did nothing with mere obstructive intent."

To explain Churchill's insistence on the indirect approach, Professor Higgins suggests the contrast between a British, Anglican tradition of opportunism and an American, Puritan tradition of total solutions. While he supports this view with striking quotations and illustrations, there are clearly other reasons, such as differences in military experience, resources, and manpower, for explaining the British view.

With the firm establishment of Allied forces on the West German border and with Russian armies at the gates of Warsaw in the early fall of 1944, the war entered a new phase. The Mediterranean approach, which had been urged at least as a secondary course of action in the spring and summer of 1944, was now reduced to British efforts to get or keep sufficient resources in the Italian Theater for Alexander's forces to make a decent showing. Arguments between the Western Allies and the Russians were to gain the center of attention.

So long as the Red Armies were hard pressed by the Germans, Stalin had made rude remarks to the Allies in the hope of getting a second front, but few specific post-war demands. The British and Americans, in the period when they were

unable to open a second front, had avoided prolonged disputes over Soviet gains in eastern Europe. In the fall of 1943, as the German army appeared on the verge of disintegration and as the Red forces occupied territories which Hitler's forces had held, Stalin made clear his intention of establishing on his frontiers governments that would be friendly to the Soviet Union. Churchill, long an opponent of Russian expansion, Tsarist or Communist, began to press Stalin for generosity toward the liberated peoples and for the establishment of Russian and British spheres of interest in the Balkans until final peace terms were concluded.

Russian post-war demands, suggested at the Moscow Conference and at Teheran in 1943, were set forth specifically at Yalta in February 1944. Mr. Feis and Professor Ehrman show Churchill trying to moderate Soviet claims, Roosevelt striving for a generous peace which would also bring the Russians into the United Nations and assure Red Army aid against Japan, and Stalin insisting on secure borders east and west.

Though the European theater was emphasized during the Allied conferences from Casablanca through Yalta, other areas of the world were not neglected. As a matter of fact, Professor Ehrman finds it necessary to apologize for the great amount of space given the small campaigns in other parts of the world. He and Mr. Feis both discuss the plans for Burma, China, and the Indian Ocean which were carefully drawn up, frequently changed, and, more often than not, dropped. Churchill's feeling that Roosevelt attached too much importance to China, the Generalissimo's pressure for greater support, command tangles in the Pacific and the CBI—all these have their place. One becomes aware in these discussions that British and American primary interests in the Far East differed widely, and that Chiang Kai-shek, who was seldom consulted, had ambitions and plans not always shared by the Western allies.

Differences in American and British approaches to European questions are also clear when one reads of British activities in Yugoslavia, Churchill's efforts to forestall the Communists in Greece, and Allied disagreement over the fate of the Italian monarchy. The problem in this, as seen by Ehrman, was that the U. S. Army, "from Marshall downwards, ignored—and deliberately—the diplomatic future."

In the days between Yalta and V-E Day, disagreements accumulated not only between the Western Powers and Russia but between the

Americans and the British. The British were inclined to press for military dispositions which would strengthen the Allied post-war bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Russians, while the Soviet leaders suspected Allied deals with the Germans in every preliminary peace discussion. The Americans, persuaded of the need of Russian aid to defeat the Japanese and the necessity to use some units in Europe for action in the Pacific, were not inclined to adopt political solutions which interfered with a quick termination of the war in Germany.

The desire for a speedy ending to the conflict doubtlessly influenced the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Professor Ehrman, in one of his most interesting chapters concludes that it was as reasonable to deduce that use of the bomb would help the peace party in Japan to force the war party to surrender as it was to assume that the two parties would agree to accept peace without such pressure. The Emperor and Togo were desperate, but could not make their views prevail. "The situation," the British historian declares, "had reached the point where the bomb—and perhaps the bomb alone—would have the required decisive effect."

In his final chapter, on Allied command, Ehrman, whose volume is the only one of the six to carry the story from V-E Day to the end of the war, does an excellent job of describing the manner in which Churchill and Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff conducted the war. He pays tribute to the contributions of British and Americans alike, serving as a corrective to Sir Arthur Bryant's description of Field Marshal Alan Brooke as the chief strategist of the war, and helps make clear that despite the disagreements and arguments and differing national interests "the Anglo-American alliance, in the last resort, must be accounted a remarkable success."

FORREST C. POAGUE, *Washington, D. C.*

Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy. By Robert E. Osgood. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. 315. \$5.00.)

This scholarly volume is based upon the assumption that nuclear world war must be avoided, but not at the cost of appeasing military aggression in less than all-out circumstances. Professor Osgood's thesis, elaborated with considerable logic, is that the waging of limited warfare is an inescapable feature of an effective American foreign policy in today's world. Appeasement of Com-

munist aggression, even on a small scale, he rightly submits, can easily lead to a deteriorating situation which would increase the probability of World War III. This is the dilemma of our time.

The author's argument is a reasoned case for a strategy of limited ends and means. His case is focused on the political facets of contemporary international politics rather than on the military effectiveness of present-day weapons. He examines the historical decline of limited forms of warfare and the rise of total war accompanied by mechanization and dehumanization. The Korean War, quite naturally, receives detailed analysis. After surveying the areas in the Middle East, the Far East, and Africa, where American and Soviet interests clash, Professor Osgood submits a pre-Sputnik strategy to meet the threat of limited Communist aggression.

Professor Osgood's volume is required reading for serious students of foreign policy and military affairs. It is worth-while off-duty reading for military planners.

Though small wars and limited military operations rather defy strict categorization, attention given to limited war seems to result in de-emphasizing the greater and more urgent problem of deterring total war. Small wars, such as Korea, must always remain basically political in definition as well as unique in geographic and military circumstances. Preparing to fight all manner and forms of possible limited wars cannot, it seems, be economically or effectively done without a priori concern for the spectre of an all-out war fought to the finish. The problem of means and ends has always been of great concern to Western thinkers, but not to Communist strategists, who possess the initiative in determining when, where, and how limited wars can best serve their ends. And this, of course, is precisely why Professor Osgood's coherent volume is a most welcome voice on a most important problem.

EUGENE M. EMME, *Montgomery, Ala.*

Military Heritage of America. By R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy. (New York: McGraw Hill. 1956. Pp. 794. \$10.00.)

Sons follow fathers in the American military profession to an extent not outdone by any other group in our society, but a distinguished father and son writing team such as the Dupuys is a rarity.

R. Ernest Dupuy has already given us such worth-while works as *Men at West Point* (1951), *Where They have Trod* (1940, 1943), *Perish the*

Sword (1939), and recently *The Compact History of the United States Army*. His greatest contribution, perhaps, is his revival of interest in Dennis Hart Mahan and in the impact of this teacher on military thought and philosophy in America.

Trevor N. Dupuy, a 1938 graduate of West Point, has already achieved fame in his own right. President of the American Military Institute, assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, he was formerly Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Harvard University. He initiated and directed two successful summer courses in military history for Army ROTC instructors at The Ohio State University.

Military Heritage of America is basically a textbook, and its publication indicates that a long neglect in American education is being corrected. (A guide for instructors teaching military history is available for use with this book.)

The Dupuys define "military" in its transcendental sense. Yet the largest portion of the book is devoted to land operations. These two soldiers nevertheless do a remarkable job of showing the impact of naval operations on ground warfare. The opening sentence of Chapter 5 reads: "Probably the most important factor in the American Revolution was the influence of British sea power. . . . Washington was perhaps more aware of this than the British commanders." The Dupuys point out that Harrison in the War of 1812 was forced to remain on the defensive until he received Commodore Perry's famous message and that the Battle of Lake Champlain was probably the most decisive action in the war. In discussing the Civil War, however, they miss the true significance of Northern control of navigable waters, and though they mention such obvious aspects of sea power as the blockade and the ironclads, they fail to discuss the extent of the Navy's amphibious and logistical contributions to the land campaigns.

While an appreciation of the strategic effect of sea power is found throughout the book, logistics receives special treatment. The authors devote an entire chapter to the impact of the Industrial Revolution on logistics. Yet they do not point out that in the trinity of warfare—strategy, tactics, and logistics—logistics has now become dominant. Logistics made tactics sterile in World War I; it dictated strategy in World War II; and it caused our logistically dependent forces in Korea to be stopped by peasant armies of China that revitalized tactics to conform to the conditions of mountain warfare.

The Dupuys have also failed to show the contribution of the airplane, and the air aspects of warfare are adequately treated only as parts of sea or land campaigns. Midway was a sea battle fought with airplanes alone, while Leyte Gulf was fought with guns, planes, and torpedoes. The so-called strategic bombardment of Europe was part of the artillery shelling that precedes an attack, this time on a continent. Yet the fact remains that as long as the airplane is dependent on the internal combustion engine and petroleum fuel, it is tied to sea and land bases and "air power" remains a function of land and sea warfare.

Perhaps as a naval officer I have no business reviewing this book. But it has been a happy task. There used to be integration and continuity in American military thought, and they came from Dennis Mahan through Sherman and Upton to Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan and then to Bliss. Sometime in the early twentieth century, continuity was broken. The Dupuys are doing their best to reconstruct it. More power to them.

JOHN D. HAYES, *Annapolis, Md.*

Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society. By Richard A. Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman O. Werner. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1956. Pp. viii, 376. Illus. \$6.50.)

Few serious students would disagree with the thesis that wars are the products of the many cross-currents of society or that wars in turn have strongly influenced political, social, and technological developments. This theme dominates *Men in Arms* and is admirably presented.

Three hundred and fifty pages are too few to allow more than an extremely simplified history of the interrelationships of warfare and western society. And simplification runs the risk of over-simplification and the consequent elimination of important topics. This reviewer was gratified to find the over-simplifications minor and the eliminated topics of lesser importance.

The authors have chosen a near-virgin field. While their concept is not new, it has not often been treated in significant historical literature. To the knowledge of this reviewer no historical account of the relationship of war and society attempts to cover as long a time-span as *Men in Arms*. The authors bring excellent credentials to their difficult undertaking. Mr. Preston and Mr.

Wise are present or former members of the staff of the Royal Military College of Canada and Mr. Werner is a well-known member of the staff of the United States Naval Academy.

If we live in a period of war today (according to the author's definition, the Cold War is a war), if the war is likely to continue for some time, and if things military are to dominate our thinking and control our national budgets, the intelligent individual must try to understand the colossus that is the modern military establishment. Some notion of the physical laws that govern thermonuclear reaction, or guide a ballistic missile in flight is not sufficient. Nor is it enough to recall vaguely the rudiments of close-order drill or some principles of war. The intelligent citizen must recognize that warfare throughout history has had a relationship to society that is both cause and effect. He must realize that the role in society of warfare and of the men who wage it has changed through the years as society has developed. This is one of the aims of *Men in Arms*, and, to this reviewer, one of the most successfully achieved.

Consciously or unconsciously, *Men in Arms* appears to have been designed as a textbook for a course in military history. In this light, its strength as a study of the interrelationship of war and society is a weakness, for, to be fully effective, it must have a knowledgeable reader. It treats campaigns and battles summarily, and properly so. Yet, to this student at least, a good knowledge of battles and campaigns is the foundation upon which an understanding of military history must be based. *Men in Arms* would make an excellent supplementary text or required reading for a course in military history.

If it is a necessary book for the intelligent layman and a useful adjunct to a course in military history, is it a necessary book for the serious student of military history? To this reviewer the answer is neither an unequivocal yes or no. Most serious students will find little new or unusual in the book. But they are likely to join this reviewer in the experience of having ideas and concepts come back into focus, and some that are at best only dimly remembered. It seems to this reviewer that this book belongs among those few that the military historian should re-read occasionally so that the trees will recede and the forest come back into view.

No review of *Men in Arms* would be complete without mentioning the excellent bibliography which also serves as a useful reading guide.

Messers. Preston, Wise, and Werner have produced one of the better books that this reviewer has been privileged to read recently and one that fills an important gap in military bibliography. It is a book offering much to the layman, the neophyte, and the serious scholar of military history.

K. JACK BAUER, *Falls Church, Va.*

The Citizen Army. By Frederick Martin Stern. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1957. Pp. 373. \$6.00.)

Soldiers of the States. By William H. Riker. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1957. Pp. 129. \$3.25.)

These two books, though similar to a certain extent in topic, are quite different in substance, framework, and approach. The first is a discussion, sometimes discursive, using historical facts to support a theory, though it is fair to say that the theory has developed out of the facts collected by Dr. Stern. The second, a history of the Militia and the National Guard in little more than one hundred pages, is so condensed that Dr. Riker's result is often more summary than narrative.

The lack of a general history of the National Guard is a void that Dr. Riker has attempted to fill, but from the point of view of a political scientist. Paying brief deference to the colonial militia, he plunges into a discussion of the constitutional issue, emphasizing the anti-federal implications of the militia clauses of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights. Then he shows how "the national government left the militia to the states and the states failed in the trust" so that the annual musters became a drunken farce, aroused opposition by their fines, and prevented the development of a widespread citizen army.

The reviewer takes issue with the author who places the growth of the volunteer spirit well after the Civil War, who neglects the military companies increasing in numbers and in strength several decades earlier and accepting the tasks of the nearly imaginary "militia," and who attributes the real growth of the National Guard almost solely to the railroad strikes and the labor troubles of the late 1870's.

Dr. Riker is interested in the progressive federalizing steps that have taken place since 1900—the granting of increasing financial aid to the States for their units, and the imposition of

greater and more severe demands for efficiency. He gives much credit to the effective lobbying of the National Guard Association, but he might have given greater credit to the patriotic hometown support from the lower Guard echelons and from private citizens. To a political scientist, the story of the Guard is the conflict between the support and desire for recognition on the part of the States and the need of manpower and desire for more control on the part of the War Department—with the arguments settled by Congress. The presentation indicates the general trend toward federalization.

Though the author has been over the documents, he has not read many pertinent court opinions. He has looked into Elihu Root's papers, but has made the usual error of assuming that Root was a friend of the National Guard; as a matter of fact, Root was trying to rob the guard units of their personnel and best officers for wartime service only.

The author seems to think the Guard is losing its four-decade long battle for unit integrity largely because the Guard today is proportionately so much weaker than the Regular Army. But the author has not slighted the sharp criticisms made by professionals of the amateur soldiers in the Guard.

Dr. Stern has analyzed the problem differently. If Riker's is a fact book, Stern's is a "think" piece. Stern has tried to decide what kind of army is best for a democracy, and he lists four types: 1) the standing army, the tool of kings; 2) the cadre-conscript army like that of Imperial Germany, compelling citizen service but never letting citizens rise in it; 3) diluted versions of the citizen army based on the volunteer system, usually ill trained and poorly led; and 4) the true citizen army based on universal obligation (as the antique militia), with well trained citizen soldiers in all ranks, supplemented by only a few professionals as needed for overseas garrison commitments.

The author prefers the fourth type and insists that it is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights by "the right to bear arms," which is essential to a free people. He finds the present National Guard a symbol of this right, and he deplores the volunteer idea as inefficient and undemocratic. While he supports the National Guard idea, he likes the Organized Reserves too, and he believes that in a future war we shall need ground forces near their homes. Yet it is strange that the author does not emphasize to a greater extent the char-

acter, training, and effectiveness of the British Home Guard.

In general, Dr. Stern is violently opposed to much of army training and to robbing citizen units of their personnel, which so irritated the National Guard in 1918 and 1945. He admires the Swiss system, which he elucidates in detail.

Dr. Stern has scanned the military organization of many countries, searching always for democratic spirit, practicality, and effectiveness. Though some passages are too summary a statement of cause and effect, the research has been extensive, the general trend of thought is reasonable. He may have quoted too ardently from General Palmer, while neglecting Palmer's dislike of the National Guard. And it is strange to find him quoting President John Adams not from Richardson's *Messages and Papers*, but from a 1953 biography which quotes a collection of Adams' *Works*. But all in all, this is an interesting analysis and a broad view of a military manpower situation.

Stern's *The Citizen Army* and Riker's *Soldiers of the States* should be on the shelves of everyone who thinks seriously on military manpower and who is a serious student of our military institutions.

ELBRIDGE COLBY, *Washington, D.C.*

Brassey's Annual. 1956. Ed. by H. G. Thursfield, R. N. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1957. Pp. xi, 452. Illus. Index. \$9.50.)

In recent years, evaluating *Brassey's* has come to be little more than an effort to separate wheat from chaff in thirty roughly related articles produced by as many authorities. The symposium-by-mail approach is bound to induce much duplication and basic disagreement, which the editor strives to reconcile. A more serious defect, however, is the tendency of disparate authorities to issue their mixtures of fact and speculation with varying clues; in these days of maximum security, as to what is true and what is hope. Every professional and amateur warrior will have to set his own course through *Brassey's* for 1956, and all that a reviewer can hope to accomplish is to point out sufficient provocative statements or beliefs to encourage readers to go on to their own examination of the articles.

Colonel The Hon. E. H. Wyndham, in "The European Scene," is certain to start a mild controversy afresh when he remarks: "The Evils which, in the past, Germany has brought on the

world in general, and herself in particular, were largely the result of the German Army being a law unto itself and not answerable to Parliament."

Popularity among his colleagues perhaps was not on the mind of Vice Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett in "The Control of Armed Forces." He gives his reasons and says forthrightly: "There is . . . a tendency in my country to select officers who are noted for their tact and popularity, rather than for their professional brilliance and strength of character. In consequence, the Services are apt to get some senior officers who are what the younger officers call 'cups of tea'—and who are far from being war-winners."

In our frantic bustle into missile war, Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, in "The Effect of New Weapons," issues an important reminder, among others, of the need for maintaining a "substantial and highly efficient reconnaissance pathfinder component." If experience in World War II produced the ratio of one pathfinder for every ten bombers, the present situation seems to "call for a composition of not less than one for one."

Brigadier C. N. Barclay, in his survey of the British draft system, reached a conclusion worth much reflection: "It should be forbidden to employ a National Serviceman on a job which is not performed in war." If it is necessary, he believes that it should be the duty of the C.O. to have the necessity of the job thoroughly explained to the man, who should be also trained as far as possible under active-service conditions. As for the draftee in general, Barclay estimates: "15 per cent. like the life, 10 per cent. hate it and are bad soldiers, and . . . the remaining 75 per cent. are lukewarm."

Lieutenant Colonel C. Paddock, in "Future Wars and the Use of Armour," pleads for the end of the heavy tank and the furtherance of airborne development, concluding with the comment: "Armies are often accused of preparing to fight the last war; now the danger is that the land forces of the West are preparing for a 'next war' that is becoming increasingly unlikely and in which they have a diminishing part to play. This is at the expense of their future tasks—the cold war and the limited war."

Space prohibits further sampling of the current edition of this annual melange of opinion and statistics, but it is hoped that enough facets have been exposed to stimulate well deserved interest.

R. W. DALY, *Annapolis, Md.*

The Civil War: A Soldier's View. Edited by Jay Luvaas. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 323. \$6.00.)

As the subtitle states, this book is "A Collection of Civil War Writings by Col. G. F. R. Henderson." It is difficult to spoil Henderson, equally difficult to gild him. The editor performs the latter feat with scholarly aplomb. In his introduction and the final chapter on "The Henderson Legacy," as well as in his footnotes, the editor gives a keenly perceptive and objective analysis of Henderson's work and influence. There are a number of maps and sketches illustrating the work, the usual author's preface, and a name and subject index. The typography is exceptionally pleasant and easy to read.

In this volume Dr. Luvaas, formerly director of the Flowers Memorial Collection at the Duke University Library and now teaching at Allegheny College, has assembled the text and original maps of Henderson's classic *The Campaign of Fredericksburg* (1886), several chapters from *The Science of War* (1905), and an essay which appeared in Mary Anna Jackson's *Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson* (1895).

Henderson is credited with being the first English officer to make a serious study of the Civil War in America after 1870, when the feats of the new German armies so dazzled the European world that the lessons of the great New World conflict were all but forgotten. Actually, Henderson belonged to that distinguished group of British military writers who were flowering towards the end of the nineteenth century, men like Sir Charles Dilke, Spenser Wilkinson, Charles Oman, and Sir John Fortescue. Henderson was a frequent contributor to military journals and had a wide influence in the British Army; his writings stimulated study of the Civil War in Britain and because they have the timeless quality of good history they are still read today. In their day, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, then professor of military history at the Staff College, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, Adjutant General, were so impressed with Henderson's writings that he was appointed to the faculty of the Cadet School at Sandhurst.

Henderson was deeply conscious that the problems of the American volunteer soldier, as so fully documented by the Civil War, would be the prob-

lems of the British volunteer in a future great war. He saw and underscored the lessons of mounted infantry versus regular cavalry, the use of entrenchments and field fortifications, and the need for a simple plan of battle that would leave appropriate scope for the initiative of competent subordinates. But, he insisted, competent subordinates could be obtained only by serious study of the interplay of strategy and tactics.

Thus, as the editor points out, in logical progression Henderson's first book, *The Campaign of Fredericksburg* was a study in tactics, in contrast to his later *magnum opus*, *Stonewall Jackson*, largely a study of the brilliant strategy of the campaigns in the Valley and Northern Virginia. This latter work is vibrantly alive, not so much because discipline, staff duties, transport, and the command system are thoroughly examined but rather because it is skillfully informed with a philosophy of war.

Though fully aware of the faults of the American volunteer forces, time and again Henderson lapses almost into panegyrics on the excellent fighting qualities of the American soldier, both North and South. Although the dogma of equality interfered with prompt obedience and discipline, the infantry marched well, were brave and stubborn, but careless of their arms; the artillery had the newest and best weapons, but tactical training was deficient; ordnance, transport, and supply departments were efficiently organized and served, but hurt by the knavery of contractors; many of the general officers were well educated and intelligent, but poor staff and regimental officers, poor reconnaissance and communications and ineffective orders militated against combinations in battle and hurt the conduct of the war. "If their discipline and leading be defective, providence seldom sides with the big battalions."

In concluding a lecture before the Aldershot Military Society in 1892, Henderson commented: "It is impossible that any soldier should not find the memoirs of such great generals as Lee, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Stuart, and many others, most interesting and instructive reading; and in the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* we have a work which far surpasses any military history that has yet been written."

VICTOR GONDOS, JR., *Washington, D. C.*

How the Merrimac Won; The Strategic Story of the C.S.S. Virginia. By Robert W. Daly. (New York: Thomas Crowell & Co. 1957. Pp. 211. \$4.00.)

Mr. Lincoln's Navy. By Richard S. West, Jr. (New York: Longmans, 1957. Pp. 328. \$6.50.)

The Rebel Shore; The Story of the Union Navy in the Civil War. By James M. Merrill. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1957. Pp. 246. \$4.75.)

It would seem that enough had already been written on the subject of the battle between the "Monitor" and the "Merrimac" which dramatized the steam and iron revolution in naval warfare. Nevertheless, *How the Merrimac Won* is different, for Professor Daly writes little about the battle itself. Instead he sets it against the strategic background of the time. This is a novel and fresh approach, which, it is hoped, will bring many imitators.

The author, who is on the faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy and a member of the American Military Institute, points out that the "Merrimac's" accomplishment was not just an ineffectual attempt to break the blockade as the popular view has been for four generations. It did in fact delay the fall of Richmond for three years during which Robert E. Lee came close to winning independence for the Confederacy.

The "Merrimac" with her poor tactical qualities, short cruising radius, and inherent structural and operating weaknesses could never have broken the blockade. She did something more important. She controlled the James River and forced McClellan's huge army to become bogged down on the Peninsula. After the "Merrimac" was destroyed by her crew following the fall of Norfolk the Union Navy gained control of the James as far as Drewry's Bluff, ten miles below Richmond. With this advantage and a more enterprising Army commander the Federals might have taken that city. As it was, control of the James River did enable the Union Navy to save the Army from destruction at the hands of Lee during the Seven Days' Battles. Readers do not have to speculate on what the story in 1862 might have been without the "Merrimac." They have only to read the record for 1864 and 1865.

A small volume, this is, nevertheless, a work of the highest scholarship. Professor Daly uses the *Official Records* of both the Navy and Army as his basic sources. Despite the outpouring of Civil War history today, this remarkable source material still remains almost untouched. Daly states that

even for naval history, the *Army Records* provide the better source material since important naval records such as the letters of flag officers and commanding officers have never been published. The author has uncovered new sources, also, especially the diary of William T. Keeler, paymaster of the "Monitor," now in the Naval Academy Museum. He prepared some fine charts, which are important to a work of this kind, but the publisher has not done them justice.

Mr. Lincoln's Navy and *The Rebel Shore* stand out among the avalanche of Civil War novels, biographies, and monographs only because they deal with the neglected naval side of the war. Neither, however, measures up to the great story that is waiting to be told—the impact that Northern control of all the waters—sea, inlets, and rivers—had on both the land campaigns and the out-come of the war. In the West, Union armies conquered where the steamboats could go. In the East, Lee's genius for two years kept the Army of the Potomac fighting in the foothills of the Alleghenies, away from its naval support. Not until Grant shifted his base to the James River and Sherman, bogged down at Atlanta, shifted his supply line to the Coast, was the war brought to a close.

Neither author catches these strategic overtones in his story of the Navy's part in the Civil War. Professor West, who like Daly, is on the faculty of the Naval Academy, gives us only another history in the pattern that began with Boynton and Scharf over three-quarters of a century ago—"Monitor" and "Merrimac," New Orleans, Vicksburg, Mobile, Fort Fisher, the "Kearsage" and "Alabama," and a few paragraphs on the blockade. Merrill comes closer but he misses his footing because his eyes seem to be on the Civil War buff trade.

Professor West is today our foremost Civil War naval historian, with definitive biographies of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and Admiral David Dixon Porter and now his *Mr. Lincoln's Navy* to his credit. This latest book is well-written and is documented from printed sources. However, West's treatment of the subject and that of Mr. Clarence E. Macarthy's in *Mr. Lincoln's Admirals* (1956) is almost as identical as the two titles.

West does touch on some of the still-to-be-salvaged maritime aspects of the war. He calls the Mississippi River system an inland sea and points out the economic need of the West that it be opened. He calls attention to Eade's concept of

SHORT REVIEWS

THE OLD REGIME 1713-63. Edited by J. O. Lindsay. [The New Cambridge Modern History, VII.] (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957. Pp. 625. \$7.50.)

In this book the military historian will find of particular interest Chapter VIII, "The Armed Forces and the Art of War," pp. 163-90, and Chapter XX, "The Seven Years War," pp. 465-86, both by the late Eric Robson; Chapter XVIII, "The War of the Austrian Succession," pp. 416-39, by Mark A. Thompson; and Chapter XXII, "Rivalries in America," by J. H. Parry and Frank Thistlewaite, pp. 514-40.

WASHINGTON AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By Esmond Wright. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 192. \$2.50.)

This is a recent volume in the "Teach Yourself History Library," edited by A. L. Rowse. The author, now Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow, is a specialist in eighteenth-century American history. He has been a fellow of the Commonwealth Fund at the University of Virginia and has taught at other American universities. Taking into account recent research regarding Washington, this book provides a stimulating analysis of the man behind the myth.

SMITH AND WESSON REVOLVERS, THE PIONEER SINGLE ACTION MODELS.

By John E. Parsons. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1957. Pp. 242. \$6.00.)

This is a thorough study, in part based on company documents, of value to historians of arms, American industry, and the West. The coated paper provides clear illustrations, and the clear notes, bibliography, and index are a pleasure to use.

GUIDED MISSILES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. By Eilene Galloway. [Senate Armed Services Committee Print.] (Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 73.)

This is a survey of developments and implications as of April 1957, with a bibliography. The author is an analyst in the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY ON RESERVE FORCES, 1775-1957. By Eilene Galloway. [House Armed Services Committee Hearings, Part 17. Pp.

441-498.] (Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 57.)

This is another study, prepared at the request of the Hon. Overton Brooks, M.C., by Eilene Galloway of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. It is a brief, documented study with a selected bibliography.

UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICIES SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Charles H. Donnelly. [85th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 100.] (Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 87. Apply.)

This is a documented summary, with a selected bibliography, prepared at the request of the Hon. Melvin Price, M.C.

CURRENT STRATEGIC THINKING AS TO FUTURE WARS. By Charles H. Donnelly. (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1957. Pp. 74. Limited edition.)

This summarizes strategic thinking as of May 1957 and includes a bibliography.

THE LIVING PAST. By Juan Lissner. Translated by J. Maxwell Brownjohn. (New York: Putnam's, 1957. Pp. 444. \$5.95.)

The Living Past is a brisk, popularization of the history, archeology, and anthropology of ancient peoples from the Sumerians to the Romans.

TREASURE UNDER THE SEA. By Nora B. Sterling. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1957. Pp. 354. \$4.50.)

Here is a popularly written account of history's most famous sea treasures from Drake and Pizarro to the seven million dollars in Philippine gold that were dumped into the Pacific in World War II. A six-page bibliography is provided for further reading.

THE NEW YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY DICTIONARY OF ARTISTS IN AMERICA, 1564-1860. By George C. Groce and David H. Wallace. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. Pp. 759. \$15.00.)

This "Library" is a comprehensive documented collection of vital information relating to more than 10,000 American artists. Included is a key to sources which provides additional data. Military artists as well as portrayers of military science are covered in this volume, which is a mine of information.

AT WHATEVER COST, THE STORY OF THE DIEPPE RAID. By *R. W. Thompson*. (New York: Coward McCann. 1957. Pp. 215. \$3.50.)

Here is a detailed account of the raid on Dieppe, August 1942. A former army officer who is now a journalist, provides us with an exciting war report instead of a documented history.

DISASTER, A PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSAY. By *Martha Wolfenstein*. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1957. Pp. 231. \$4.00.)

How people react to large-scale disasters in both peacetime and wartime is the subject of this volume by a visiting professor in the graduate school of psychology of City College, New York.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL OPINION, A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE. By *Bruce L. Smith* and *M. Chetra*. [Prepared for the Rand Corporation by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C.] (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1956. Pp. 325. \$6.00)

The authors of this volume have produced a colorful, annotated bibliography containing 2,600 items covering the period 1943-1955. It will be of major interest to those interested in psychological warfare and propaganda.

SHAKA ZULU, THE RISE OF THE ZULU EMPIRE. By *E. A. Ritter*. (New York: Putnam's. 1957, pp. 383. \$5.00)

This is a careful biographical study of a great empire-builder and warrior, 1787-1828, which is based upon available records and talks with Zulu leaders. The military historian will find in it much valuable material.

MODERN AIRMANSHIP. Edited by *Neil D. Van Sickle*. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. 1957. Pp. viii, 862. \$9.95.)

Nineteen civil and military experts contribute in this volume authoritative essays on every aspect of modern flying, including visual and instrument flight, techniques, weather, aerodynamics, structure and propulsion, navigation, radio, etc. This a valuable text for airmen and a worthy reference work for any technical, general, or military library.

RAILROADS, YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By *Walter Buehr*. (New York: Putnam's. 1957. Pp. 72. \$2.50.)

Illustrated by the author, this provides a brief introduction for the juvenile historian.

AIR SPY: THE STORY OF PHOTO INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II. By *Constance Bobington-Smith*. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xii, 266. \$4.00.)

Here is an important story told by one of the best practitioners of photo intelligence. It provides a behind-the-scenes view of the "Bismarck" chase, Commando raids, the Allied bomber offensive, D-Day in Normandy, and very significant forecasts of U-boat and aircraft production plus the highly important discovery of the V-weapons long before they struck at England. —E.E.

GLAD ADVENTURE. By *Francis B. Sayre*. (New York: Macmillan. 1957. Pp. 356. \$6.00.)

This is the autobiography of the American lawyer and diplomat who held, among other positions, that of High Commissioner for the Philippines, escaping from Corregidor by submarine, and that of American representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council from which he retired in 1952.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE MAKING OF THE JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT. By *Jerome C. Cohen*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957. Pp. 293. \$6.00.)

Cohen gives us in this volume a scholarly analysis of all major elements shaping our foreign policy vis-a-vis the Japanese peace treaty from public opinion to the interrelationships of all government agencies that were involved.

THE RETURN OF GUNNER ASCH. By *Hans H. Kirst*. (Boston: Little Brown. 1957. Pp. 1957. Pp. 310. \$3.95.)

This readable novel, the last of a trilogy, brings the hero to the last days of a defeated Germany.

FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE. By *Ian Fleming*. (New York: Mamillan. 1957. Pp. 253. \$3.50.)

Fleming in this thriller relates the almost-successful adventures of a British secret agent's counter-activities against SMERSH, the Soviet murder organization.

PATHS TO PEACE: A STUDY OF WAR, ITS CAUSES AND PREVENTION. Edited by Victor H. Wallace, with foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1957. Pp. xx, 397. \$3.75.)

This is a series of twenty essays by Australian scholars on the pursuit of peace. Discussed are historical aspects of recurrent wars, the biological struggle for existence, nationalism as a cause of war and peace, threat to civilization from atomic warfare, the role of the U.N. in preserving peace, world population and food supply, the ideological conflict, role of education and propaganda, culture patterns and social tensions, economic policy and social structure in relation to war, frustration and aggression, world's religions as influences for peace and war, the proposal for a world government, and the role that may be played by the individual citizen. —E.E.

PERIODICALS*

III. World War II (Cont.)

- "The Capture of North Beveland: A Reconnaissance Regiment in the Battle of the Scheldt," by Maj. T. M. Hunter, in *Canadian Army Journal*, April 1957.
- "How the Allies Let Victory Slip in 1944," by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1957.
- "Italy—The Fumbled Opportunity," by Capt. B. H. Liddle Hart, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1957.
- "Soviet Navy in World War II," by Jurg Meister, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1957.
- "Origins of Pacific Strategy," by Louis Morton, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1957.
- "A Few Men in Soldier Suits," by Helena Huntington Smith, in *American Heritage*, August 1957. (The Bulge, 1944.)
- "Reflections on Operation 'See Loewe,'" by Maj. Gen. B. T. Wilson, in *Army Quarterly*, July 1957.

IV. NATIONAL WARFARE Current Problems

- "The Northern Theory," by John Antrim, in *An Cosantoir* (Dublin), December 1956. (Does

a northern homeland nurture a militant people?)

- "Tito's Army," by Capt. Robert B. Asprey, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1957.
- "B. H. Liddell Hart Letter to Field Marshal Wavell," in *Military Review*, June 1957. (On John Bloch, 1948.)
- "Strategy of the Middle East," by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1957.
- "Simonstown, Future South African Naval Headquarters," by Lt. Cdr. E. K. Bankes, in *Com-mando* (Cape Town), March 1957.
- "The Spanish Naval Academy," by Lt. Cdr. Joseph Buchalter, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1957.
- "La Pentomica: Divisione USA del Domani," by Capt. Capizzi-Cittadini, in *Rivista Militare* (Rome), May 1957.
- "Le Rapport Nixon and le Défense de l'Afrique," by Pierre Chateauvieux, in *Revue de Défense Nationale* (Paris), June 1957.
- "Au-delà de Clausewitz: Une Nouvelle Doctrine de la Guerre," by Gen. Combaut, in *Revue de Défense Nationale* (Paris), April 1957.
- "Party Control of the Soviet Army," by Maj. Edward F. Danowitz, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1957.
- "Some Recent Books in British History: The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," by D. J. McDougall, in *Canadian Historical Review*, June 1957.
- "Dogmas Militaires," by Gen. Aniceto Munoz Fuentes, in *Memorial del Ejercito de Chile*, March-April 1957.
- "Scandinavians on Guard in the Middle East," by Erik J. Friis, in *American-Scandinavian Review*, June 1957.
- "El Poder Aereo de Venezuela," by Capt. Humberto Colmenares Rivera, in *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas* (Caracas), October 1956.
- "Le Critiche al Douhet ed in Probabili Aspetti di un Conflitto Futuro," by Col. Rodolfo Gentile, in *Rivista Aeronautica* (Rome), February 1957.
- "French Marines," by Cap. de Corv. Jean Francois Gravrand, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1957.
- "Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary?" by Lt. Col. A. Green, in *An Cosantoir* (Dublin), December 1956. (Reprinted from *Australian Army Journal*.)
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- "La Guerre du Viet-Minh," by Un Groupe

*Prepared by R. W. Davis and M. O'Quinlivan.

- d'Officers, in *Revue Militaire d'Information* (Paris), February-March 1957.
- "Incalculable Factor," by Maj. Reginald Hargreaves, in *Military Review*, June 1957. (War and the weather.)
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- "The Soviet Union and Its Submarine Forces," by Lt. C. Huan, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1957.
- "The East German Wehrmacht," by Maj. Walter D. Jacobs, in *Army*, July 1957.
- "Die strategische Lage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland under de deutsche Verteidigungsbeitrag zur Nato," by Capt. Bernd Klug, in *Truppenpraxis* (Darmstadt), no. 3, 1957.
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- "Tradicion Militar," by Capt. Luis Alberto Leoni, in *Revista Militar* (Buenos Aires), November-December 1956.
- "The Swiss Artillery," by Maj. H. E. R. Martin, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1957.
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- "Decisions in Sinai," by Lt. Col. Moshe Rose as told to Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1957.
- "The Himalayan Frontier in the Air Age," by Sqdn. Ldr. D. R. Seth, in *Indian Air Force Quarterly*, April-June 1956.
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- "John Barnwell and British Western Policy," by Mrs. George Fisher, in *South Carolina Historical Association Proceedings*, 1956.
- "Arms and the British Diplomat in the French Revolutionary Era," by Richard Glover, in *Journal of Modern History*, September 1957.
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- "Riders of the Whirlwind," by Lt. Col. G. A. Hardwicks, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1957. (The Mongols.)
- "The Evolution of Military Music," by Capt. C. Ashford Holt, in *Canadian Army Journal*, April 1957.
- "Warwick the Kingmaker," by Paul Kendall, in *History Today*, September 1957.
- "Mazeppa," by L. R. Lewitter, in *History Today*, September 1957.
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- "Augustus, the Institutional," by Brig. A. L. Pemberton, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1957.
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- "The Praying Captain—A Cavalier's Memoirs," edited by Lt. Col. Peter Young, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, June 1957.

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"Roots of Japanese Imperialism: A Memorandum of General le Gendre," by Ernest L. Presseisen, in *Journal of Modern History*, June 1957.

"L'Empereur et l'Opinion Publique, 1813-1814," by Gen. Reynault, in *Revue Historique de l'Armée* (Paris), August 1957.

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"The Indian Mutiny of 1857: The Siege of Lucknow," Part 3, by Jon Manchip White, in *History Today*, July 1957.

V. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

"Atomic Infatuation," by Capt. Richard H. Bowers, in *Ordnance*, September-October 1957.

"Some Indian Army Sabretaches," by Brig. H.

Bullock, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, June 1957.

"The Trend of Facsimile in Military Communications," by A. G. Cooley, in *Signal*, July 1957.

"The Case for Weapons Limitation," by H. A. De Weerd, in *Army*, February 1957.

"The Clermont and the Beginnings of Steam," by Lt. (jg) James L. Degnan, Jr., in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1957.

"Burp Guns: Part II, The Role of the Burp," by Cmdt. Eric Gegan, in *An Cosantoir* (Dublin), February 1957.

"Toy Cannon," by F. H. Griffith, in *Hobbies*, July 1957.

"New Swiss Infantry Rifle," by Col. E. H. Harrison, in *American Rifleman*, July 1957.

"Lt. Beale and the Camel Caravans through Arizona," by Velma Rudd Hoffman, in *Arizona Highways*, October 1957.

"Operation Camel: An Experiment in Animal Transportation in Texas, 1857-1860," by Frank Bishop Lammons, in *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, July 1957.

"Musket and Rifle," Part 2, by T. H. McGuffie, in *History Today*, July 1957.

"Signaling in English Marine Art," by Cdr. Hillary P. Mead, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1957.

"The Revolution in Weapons Development," by Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, in *Army*, September 1957.

"Creating the IRBM," by Joseph C. Moquin, in *Ordnance*, September-October 1957.

"Evolution of the Amphibious Tank," by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1957.

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"A Man to Remember: Ole Hermann Krag," by Harold L. Peterson, in *American Rifleman*, July 1957.

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"Artillery in Medieval India," by Vishmanath, in *Artillery Journal* (India), December 1956.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

HONOR ROLL OF "EVERY MEMBER GET A MEMBER CAMPAIGN"

Editor's Note: The response to President Dupuy's "Every Member Get a Member" campaign was gratifying, thanks to the cooperation and efforts of the Institute Members listed below. The asterisks denote the following: * obtained more than one member; ** converted annual member to life member; *** obtained new member for life member. It is hoped that activity in recruiting new members will be continued as almost the whole of the Institute's income is from membership dues and subscriptions. Please let us know if there are any corrections to be made in this list.

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*Please inform the editor of any inaccuracies in this list.

COMMITTEE FOR PROPOSED ARMED FORCES MUSEUM

President Eisenhower announced in January the appointment of a 12-member committee, under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Earl Warren, to consider proposals for an Armed Forces museum to be located in Washington. Leonard Carmichael, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, was appointed executive director of the committee. According to Carmichael, such a museum, about which the President is enthusiastic, has been under discussion for more than a year.

AMI TRUSTEES ON UNORTHODOX WARFARE

Three trustees of the AMI—Dr. James D. Atkinson, Prof. Tibor Kerekes, and R. Adm. John D. Hayes—discussed "Our Military Policy and Communist Unorthodox Warfare" on The Georgetown University Forum, a regular Sunday afternoon television feature on Washington's Channel 5, 26 Jan. 1958. A basis for the discussion was Atkinson's publication of his "American Military Policy and Communist Unorthodox Warfare" in the January 1958 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. In that article he raised the question of whether or not military planners have become so preoccupied with the idea

of a big war that they have failed to prepare for the little wars that might be forced upon us.

GUIDE TO MICROFILMS

The American Historical Association informs us that it has received a grant from the Council on Library Resources to prepare a Guide to Photographed Historical Materials in the United States and Canada. Preparation of the Guide will take about two years, and publication will follow.

TRANSLATIONS OF RUSSIAN PUBLICATIONS

The Central Intelligence Agency disclosed in February 1958 that it is spending nearly \$500,000 a year to collect, translate and abstract more than 1,000 Russian periodicals and numerous books. Of the translations and abstracts made, 95 per cent are available to the public through the Library of Congress and the John Crerar Library in Chicago. During the present year it is estimated that translations and abstracts of Russian scientific literature will run to 35,000 pages.

In Philadelphia the major science information services have formed the National Federation of Science Abstracting and Indexing Services.

CIVIL WAR IN THE NEWS

Efforts in the last session of the Virginia legislature to change the name of the Little River Turnpike, which runs between Alexandria and the West Virginia line, to the Ranger Mosby Highway met with opposition and defeat. Opposing the move were the United Daughters of the Confederacy and Delegate Frank Moncure, one of the Old Dominion's most bitter racists. To Moncure, according to the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, "Mosby was a turncoat. He turned Republican, you know, and served with the Federal Government with . . . Grant . . . after the war."

Meanwhile, "The Gray Ghost" rides on in a weekly television show over a Washington, D.C., channel, and his biographer, Virgil Carrington Jones, continues to delight his readers and hearers with the fruits of his historical studies. In an excellent illustrated lecture on the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid of 1864 before the Washington, D.C., Civil War Round Table on the evening of 11 Mar. 1958, Jones, with the aid of some photographic legerdemain at the National Archives and a handwriting expert from the District of Columbia Police Department, proved that Dahlgren's signature on a paper found on his body, heretofore regarded as a forgery, was genuine. The paper in question described the burning of Richmond and the killing of Davis and his cabinet as purposes of the raid, which the Rebels accepted and the Union denied. Jones's treatment of the matter was a tour de force in the exploitation of external evidence.

The national assembly of the Civil War Centennial Commission met in the auditorium of the Interior Department in Washington in mid-January under the terms of the act creating the Commission. Its purpose was to make recommendations concerning the commemoration of the centennial

of the Civil War, 1961-1965. Although the governors of 18 states were represented, together with various patriotic groups, there was not one official representative from below the border states of Maryland and Kentucky. A representative of the Civil War Round Table of Richmond, however, explained that Governor Almond of Virginia was interested. Perhaps the most significant recommendation made was that the Commission should stimulate the collection, cataloging, and dissemination of basic Civil War materials such as manuscripts, newspapers, maps, and pictures for their better preservation and use by students. Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant III, chairman of the Commission, presided.

Maury A. Bronson, a Boston dealer and collector, paid \$1,500 last January for the letter from Pierce to Van Buren of 18 Apr. and the latter's reply of 20 Apr. 1861, shortly after the attack on Ft. Sumter. In this exchange of correspondence Pierce urged a meeting of former Presidents (Tyler, Buchanan, and Fillmore, besides the correspondents) in an effort to halt the war. Van Buren's view was that the initiative for such a meeting properly belonged with the incumbent President, whose name he did not use, rather than with himself, "the senior ex-President."

Under a Bowling Green, Ky., dateline of 6 Jan. 1958, we learn that on that date the Circuit Court of Warren County dismissed treason and conspiracy indictments of 1862 against three Civil War rebels—Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, John Hunt Morgan, and John C. Breckenridge—who "had been accused of invading Kentucky," according to the *New York Times*, "for the purpose of compelling her to unite with the so-called Confederate States of America, of taking possession of Warren County and confiscating court records to prevent the

administration of law.'” The indictments against a number of residents of Warren County for forming a Rebel state government were also dismissed. Kentucky, of course, never left the Union and Buckner became a post-war governor of that state. Morgan was later captured. Escaping, he was captured again and shot on the spot. Breckenridge, a onetime Vice President of the United States, lived abroad after the war until he received a Presidential pardon. The records of the indictments, which disappeared four years after they were made, came to light last November when workmen moved an old filing cabinet out of the courthouse.

The Civil War conference held at Gettysburg College in November 1957 (see the last issue of *Military Affairs*, pages 221-222) was apparently so successful that a similar conference is planned for November of this year. A short summer program, with special attention to Civil War operations in the Gettysburg area, is also scheduled, according to Robert Fortenbaugh of the Gettysburg history faculty.

CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL COMMISSION

On 6 April 1958, Major General U. S. Grant 3rd, chairman of the Civil War Centennial Commission, announced the appointment of Karl S. Betts as Executive Director of the Commission. Mr. Betts, who lives in Catonsville, Md., is one of the best known Civil War enthusiasts in the nation, and has been a leading figure in Civil War Round Table activities. He is a founder and past president of the Round Table of the District of Columbia, and served as chairman of the National Centennial Committee that sponsored the legislation creating the Federal Commission. General Grant stated that Mr. Betts was the “unanimous choice of the Commission’s Executive Committee, which made a very careful search for a man of outstanding qualifications.” The new Executive Director is a graduate of the University of Michigan, and has served as publicity director of various civic and national organizations, including the All-American Aircraft Shows and the Gordon Bennett International Balloon Races.

NECROLOGY

TRACY BARRETT KITTREDGE

Capt. Tracy Barret Kittredge (USNR, Ret.) died on 22 December 1957 of Hodgkin’s disease at the Bethesda Medical Center. He was 66. During both world wars he served on the staff of the U.S. Naval commander in Europe and at other times held various important posts, including membership on the staff of the Supreme Economic Council at the Paris Peace conference. From 1926 to 1939 he had a connection with the International Labor Organization. Kittredge served on the historical section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a naval member and lectured on foreign policy and military history at both Princeton Univer-

sity and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was also the author of two books: *Certain Naval Lessons of the Great War* (1921) and *U.S.-British Naval cooperation, 1900-1942* (1946). His wife, Eleanor, survives him.

GENERAL PALLIS

The Greek Military Mission in Washington informs us that one of our Institute Members, General S. Pallis, died recently. The exact time and date of burial were not given. General Pallis was formerly on duty with the Greek Military Mission in Washington, D. C., and had only lately returned to his homeland.

INSTITUTES, CONFERENCES, AND COURSES

The Fifth Annual Session of the Institute on Historical and Archival Management will be held at Radcliffe College, June 23-August 1, 1958. The Institute, sponsored by the Department of History of Harvard University, will be under the direction of Dr. Lester J. Cappon, who is also director of the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg.

The Pennsylvania State University at University Park, Pa., will hold a two-weeks course of lectures and practice on underwater missile engineering. The course is intended to be useful not only to engineers, naval officers, and scientists, but also to all those desiring a comprehensive introduction to the broad field of guided missiles.

The Service Center for Teachers of History, a branch of the American Historical Association, published five booklets last year on the historiography of specific topics in American history. *The American Revolution: A Review of Changing Interpretations* (20 pages) by Edmund S. Morgan is a sample.

The National Military-Industrial Conference held the Fourth Annual Military-Industrial Conference in Chicago, 17-19 February 1958. The Conference is designed to bring together all those diverse elements of American life interested in the defense and security of the nation. Many of the country's foremost "thought leaders" on national policy decisions were in the group of approximately twelve hundred spokesmen for commerce, industry, government, educational and professional fields, and the armed forces.

The Sixth Conference on Early American History in Williamsburg met on 22-23 November 1957, at the invitation of the College of William and Mary, and the Institute of Early American History and Culture.

AIR FORCE ACADEMY

On a site five by seven miles in extent at an altitude of well over a mile, on the north-south highway linking Denver and Colorado Springs, the new Air Force Academy is going up against the front range of the Rockies. Toiling to build it are 5,000 workers. The principal building is six stories high and the equivalent of three city blocks in length. Its architecture is modernistic. Cadet rooms on the second, third, fifth, and sixth levels have picture windows with draperies and, although large enough to accommodate four persons, are intended for occupancy by only two. It is thus no wonder that the cost is estimated to go to \$150,000,000, although only \$133,000,000 have been appropriated. The Academy, now in session at nearby Lowry Air Force Base, is expected to move to its new quarters in September 1958, when its enrollment will be only 1,000. Later it is expected that its enrollment will reach a maximum of 2,600.

Although we have heard little about the faculty and nothing about the Academy's library, there has been much in the daily press about the chapel, whose design was still unresolved in January. Shocked by the original modernistic design, conservative Congressmen forced its revision, only to have Senator Robertson of Virginia find that the revised plans were "worse than the old ones." In his opinion, according to the *New York Times*, the new design "would serve as well for a skating rink as for a house of worship."

ARMED FORCES DAY

President Eisenhower designated the third Saturday in May of each year as Armed Forces Day. This year, 1958, the observance is on 17 May.

BATTLESHIP "WISCONSIN"

Our item in the last issue of *Military Affairs*, page 222, regarding the decommissioning of the "Wisconsin" stands in need of correction, since she did not actually strike her colors for transfer to the Atlantic Reserve Fleet until 8 March 1958. The U.S. Navy is now without a battleship in active service for the first time since before the Spanish-American War, when the "Indiana," the "Massachusetts," and the "Oregon" were launched.

TOYNBEE ON LIMITING WEAPONS

Arnold J. Toynbee, the British historian, proposed in February of this year that atomic weapons be limited to the United States and the U.S.S.R. in an effort to save the human race. Speaking, as a visiting scholar-in-residence at the opening of Washington and Lee University's International Relations Week, Toynbee asserted that no future war would be started by a premeditated attack by the U.S.S.R. "Instead," as reported by the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, "the danger is of someone 'losing his head and starting an atomic war that more responsible people never intended to start.'" He added, according to the *Post and Times Herald*, that the U.S. "should make 'sincere, realistic, diplomatic and untiring efforts to come to an understanding with Russia.'"

DISBANDING OF BERLIN HORSE PLATOON

The American military police horse platoon in Berlin, one of the last mounted units in the U.S. Army, is to be disbanded soon. This platoon, with 31 horses, has been used for patrolling the West Berlin border. The platoon's horses were originally captured from a Hungarian cavalry unit by U.S. airborne troops at Mecklenburg in 1945.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

The Service inaugurated a new visitor's center and headquarters for Fort Frederic National Monument on St. Simons Island, Georgia, 23 February, 1958. It is also supporting a proposal to erect a memorial honoring men of the famous 101st Airborne Infantry Division, which is to be built within the District of Columbia or its environs. There is also a proposal to establish a memorial on the site of Fort Clatsop, Oregon, which is associated with the winter encampment of the famed Lewis and Clark Expedition. Continuing progress is reported toward the completion of the Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia, Pa.

MEETING OF ACADEMY SUPERINTENDENTS

Superintendents from the United States Armed Forces Academies met together for the first time 18 April 1958, when Lieutenant General Garrison H. Davidson, Superintendent of the Military Academy, West Point, Major General James E. Briggs, Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, Denver, Rear Admiral William R. Smedberg III, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Annapolis, and Rear Admiral Frank A. Leamy, Superintendent of the Coast Guard Academy, opened the first session of a two-day conference. Discussion of requirements for educational programs was the objective.

FRANK HOUGH DIES

Just before going to press we learned of the death of Colonel Frank Hough in Mexico, 18 May 1958. He was an associate editor and Trustee of the Institute. We mourn the passing of this stalwart member.

HISTORY BEING MADE AT HISTORIC SITE

Modern military history is being made at a historic site in Maryland. Granted to George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, in 1648, this land—once a slave-operated tobacco plantation—is now the proving ground of the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories, and the 300-year-old house is headquarters for the testing of fuzes which cause bombs, rockets, or mortar shells to explode at the instant they will do the most damage to the enemy.

The house is built like a fort—a necessity in the 1600's: its walls, a foot and a half thick, are made of bricks brought back from England as ballast in the sailing ships which carried cargoes of tobacco on their eastward runs.

So isolated is the proving ground that until it was leased from the present holders in 1942, neither power nor telephone lines entered the area. In fact, in its early days, even burials were made on the premises; there are a number of graves, marked only with simple patterns of fieldstone.

Now, however, the old tobacco lands are no longer under cultivation. Where the weed once flourished there are rocket launchers of various types: some, cables which direct the rocket toward its target; others, rails; still others, tubes. There are field mortars. There is even an aircraft suspended high above ground, and an arrangement of cables where a rocket can be fired and held while measurements are made of the effect upon the fuze which it contains.

The Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories are concerned with the research and design of fuzes for a wide variety of weapons, ranging from small mortar shells to large guided missiles. Laboratory testing of the newly-designed fuzes is conducted in Washington. But no test made on a bench can show exactly how a fuze will behave when it is fitted into

a missile and fired at a target. Many of these firings are made at the Laboratories' proving ground, little more than an hour's drive from Washington.

The missiles which are used for these tests are identical with those which would be used in warfare—with one important exception. They do not contain the main explosive charge, which is omitted not only because of safety but also because it permits observation of fuze operation without destruction of costly targets.

Tests at the proving ground serve two main purposes, providing answers to these questions: Will the fuze operate as it should? Will it be safe for using troops to handle and fire? Until the answers to both questions are "Yes," the Laboratories' work is unfinished, for weapons must be safe for the operators, but deadly for their targets.

The engineers who work at the proving ground fire their projectiles over part of the path traced by John Wilkes Booth when attempting to escape after he had assassinated President Lincoln.

Peculiar to this area are a group of people known as "Wesorts," descendants of the Indians who originally lived on the land and intermarried with the Africans who worked there. Their name is thought to be a corruption of "Jesuits," for the converted Indians so called themselves after the order which owned the territory. The Wesorts were a legally recognized category, at least for a time, since the words were used in deeds, and in certain regulations.

The land on which the proving ground is situated belongs to a modern corporation in direct line from the original grantees. It has been rented by the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories since November 9, 1942.

MONCADO AWARD COMMITTEE

This Committee is in process of reorganization, by direction of the Board of Trustees at their meeting of 2 May 1958. The new program will be announced in the summer 1958 issue.

NEW ADDRESS OF THE AMI

The attention of members and subscribers is drawn to the new address of the AMI: Room 704, 511 - 11th Street, N. W., Washington 4, D. C. We wish to express our gratitude to the *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, which has so generously provided us with a more adequate and centrally located office at the new address.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Type manuscripts on one side of 8½ x 11 inch bond paper. Leave ample margins and double-space throughout, including footnotes and quotations to be set in reduced type. Footnotes should be double-spaced on sheets separate from the text and placed after the last page of the article. In matters of style and footnote citations the latest edition of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers . . .* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) is to be followed. For points not covered adequately therein the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) should be consulted.

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